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Abstract: 
     This paper is a qualitative historical analysis of Northern Ireland’s Troubles. 
Over a period of approximately thirty years, sectarian violence in Northern 
Ireland dominated the headlines of newspapers in both the Republic of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. Despite this violent history, Northern Ireland has 
enjoyed relative peace and stability since the passage of the Belfast Agreement in 
1998. This paper aims to better understand why and how Northern Ireland endured 
a generation of brutal sectarian violence and emerged into a new era of peace and 
mutual understanding. In doing so, this paper incorporates theories from peace 
and conflict studies and uses them to frame traditional historical analyses of 
Northern Ireland’s Troubles. The ultimate goal of this paper is to integrate 
traditional history and contemporary theories in peace and conflict studies in 
order to explain the transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland, thereby 
providing a basis to better grasp its current sociopolitical reality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Conflict is never a static phenomenon. …It is constantly changed by ongoing human interaction 
and it continuously changes the very people who give it life and the social environment in which 
it is born, evolves and perhaps ends.” 
  -- John Paul Lederach, 1997  
 On September 16th 2011, the British Newspaper, The Guardian, ran a story titled 
“BELFAST PARK OPENS DOOR TO PEACE.” The ‘door’ in question is actually a gate in one 
of the so called ‘peace walls,’ which were built throughout Northern Ireland during the violent 
period of conflict known as “The Troubles.” While this particular wall has only been in place 
since 1994, others have been in place since 1969. The article continues, “… for the first time 
since any of the barriers throughout the city were built over the past four decades, a breach will 
be made in one.” Local Justice Minister David Ford called the opening of the Gate in the 
Alexandra Park area of Belfast “an important day for Northern Ireland” which required “great 
courage [in taking] the first step to open up an interface barrier that has been a symbol of 
division and segregation for so long.”  
In 1998, a groundbreaking peace agreement, known as the Belfast Agreement, was 
signed and approved by the British and Irish Government, which sought to finally put an end 
sectarian violence and political conflict in Northern Ireland. The Belfast Agreement was 
effective in greatly reducing sectarian violence and developing cross-community relations in 
Northern Ireland. But, often less talked about are the long-lasting implications of the Northern 
Ireland peace process. The opening of a gate in the Alexandra Park ‘peace wall’ some thirteen 
years after the Belfast Agreement shows that the peace process is still in effect in Northern 
Ireland. While cross-border councils were set up, paramilitary prisoners were released, and new 
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political system was implemented, the strongest indication that peace is thriving in Northern 
Ireland is that small-scale, community level peacebuilding continues to take place across the 
country. 
The continuation of the peace process in Northern Ireland is particularly remarkable 
given that the majority of the country’s population was alive to witness during The Troubles. 
Following the partition of Ireland in 1922, in which the Government of the United Kingdom split 
the island into two self-governing territories (Northern and Southern Ireland). While the Unionist 
majority in Northern Ireland expressed a desire to remain within the United Kingdom, the 
Republican movement in the South resulted in the Irish War of Independence. Southern Ireland 
won its sovereignty and with the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, became the Irish 
Free State. From this moment on, the island of Ireland became two separate countries with two 
competing notions of identity and Unionist hegemony dominated Northern Ireland’s political 
system. 
The Troubles came about in the late 1960s following generations of Unionist dominated 
politics in Ulster. A civil rights movement orchestrated by the predominantly Catholic 
Nationalist population of Northern Ireland caused consternation among the predominantly hard-
line Protestant Unionists, who responded harshly to protesters. It was the harsh backlash in 
response to this movement that led to the tit-for-tat violent escalation known now as The 
Troubles. Brutal displays of violence tore Northern Ireland apart. Bloody Sunday in 1972, a 
massacre of civil rights protesters committed by British soldiers radicalized an already uneasy 
Nationalist population. Responses from Republican paramilitary groups such as the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) engaged in a violent campaign that was equally atrocious and 
condemnable. As The Troubles escalated during the 1970s and 1980s, they attracted increasing 
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international attention. Republican Hunger Strikes, assassination attempts on British political 
figures including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher herself, and senseless acts of murder 
severely undermined the peace process, leaving many wondering what exactly they were fighting 
for. As violent conflict increasingly drew the ire of a population yearning for normalcy in day-to-
day life, Northern Ireland began working towards developing a culture of peace. It was this 
ideological shift that allowed a fledgling peace process, which began with the failed Sunningdale 
Agreement of 1973, to finally take hold in the 1990s, and point Northern Ireland in the direction 
of cross-community understanding, peace, and prosperity. 
With similar conflicts still raging across the globe, Northern Ireland’s Troubles have 
largely come and gone. This research project is an exploration of why the conflict in Northern 
Ireland emerged, escalated, plateaued, and dissipated. Numerous works on Northern Ireland 
present a linear history of the country from partition to present, offering a time-line structured 
analysis, with dates and summaries of key events. Others offer qualitative studies of Northern 
Ireland during The Troubles, which further augment the body of literature by providing 
sociological and anthropological analyses of the conflict. This paper is an engagement of both 
styles of writing. A synthesis of two academic fields, this paper frames a political history with 
several theories presented in peace and conflict studies, with the ultimate goal of constructing a 
multi dimensional political history of Northern Ireland’s Troubles. It is my position that by 
applying aspects of conflict theory to the political history of The Troubles, we can better 
comprehend the transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In doing so, we can more 
accurately understand how the damage of three decades of violence is now giving way to 
peaceful, cross-community development and pragmatic politics in Northern Ireland. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 Interpreting the evolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland can be read as an open text. 
As the conflict is still evolving, subsequent historical analysis of The Troubles will too. 
Academics, journalists, politicians, religious leaders, and members of the public all see The 
Troubles through different lenses. Some see the violence of the period as a thing of the past—
buried by the growth of a culture of peace and a fear of the resurgence of sectarian conflict. 
Some see the lingering effects of The Troubles as a problem for the present and future, while 
others view it on a spectrum, locating themselves and their opinions accordingly. In the 
following literature review, I will outline several tenets of conflict theory and will offer a brief 
history of The Troubles. The literature review will serve as both a theoretical and historical 
framework upon which the remainder of this thesis is built. 
On Conflict 
 Conflict theorists John Paul Lederach and Johann Galtung sit at the forefront of the field 
of peace and conflict studies. Lederach’s extensive examination of deeply divided societies 
provides a framework with which to approach the needs of key groups within a given conflict 
(Lederach, 1997). Galtung is widely known for his research on what he calls “structural 
violence,” or the presence of institutionalized disadvantages for individuals or groups because of 
socioeconomic, cultural, racial affiliations. Galtung’s concept of structural violence is found at 
the root of virtually all conflicts. Both theorists’ ideas are integral to understanding the roots, 
outbreak, escalation, and dissipation of conflict, and in this case, The Troubles. 
 Lederach argues that conflict emerges out of “deeply divided societies” (Lederach, 
1997:11) In itself; this idea is not exactly a groundbreaking concept. It doesn’t take much critical 
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analysis to recognize that a society deeply divided along the lines of religious, racial, economic, 
and or political ideology is ripe for some degree of conflict. From Lederach’s work on deeply 
divided societies, we can glean a theoretical understanding of what perhaps was (is) at the root of 
The Troubles in Northern Ireland. First, Lederach believes that in deeply divided societies there 
is a presence of distinct identity units (Lederach 1997:13). In Northern Ireland, there were 
essentially two: Catholic Nationalists and Protestant Unionists (and still are to this day—though 
this is slowly changing). Over the course of The Troubles, these polarized communities 
increasingly sought security from non-governmental sectarian groups. Protestants often found 
themselves looking to the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Association 
for protection that the state-sponsored Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) could not provide. 
Catholics, feeling marginalized and targeted by these groups as well as the RUC and British 
Army, were ‘protected’ by Republican paramilitary groups including the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army, Official Irish Republican Army, and the smaller Irish National Liberation 
Army. When paramilitary groups, not state-sponsored law enforcement officials, are given 
agency (on a large scale) it calls into question the legitimacy of the state. The development of 
this problem, in turn, lends credence to an idea which Lederach supports, that at the root of 
conflict ideology is a notion that “if we do not dominate, we will be dominated” (Lederach 
1997:15). As we will see in chapter 4, the derailment of early peace agreements during The 
Troubles (early 1970s) was due in large part to the pervasiveness of this idea.  
 Ultimately, Lederach argues that conflict at any level is driven by “psychosocial 
elements⎯ long standing animosities rooted in a perceived threat to identity and survival” 
(Lederach 1997:17). The conflict in Northern Ireland is no different. With a conflicting ideology 
dating back centuries, Northern Nationalists and Unionists have disputed their own self-interest 
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for generations, rarely seeing eye-to-eye. Lederach’s conclusions might seem at times 
predictable, as he argues that “our challenge is to find strategic and practical approaches that help 
establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation that takes seriously the immediate and 
deep rooted needs of divided societies” (Lederach 1997:152). While Lederach offers a discussion 
of identity and conflict in divided societies, fellow conflict theorist Johan Galtung discusses the 
institutions that cause a society to be deeply dived. 
 Johan Galtung is well known among peace and conflict theorists for his extensive work 
on the concept of “Structural Violence.” A firm understanding of structural violence is important 
to the development of a history of The Troubles in Northern Ireland because the sociological 
implications of its presence are tremendous. In his work, Galtung expresses that power is not an 
abstract concept, but instead something that can be manipulated and distributed much like a 
natural resource (Galtung 1969:167-191). This manipulation and unequal distribution of power is 
the basic conceptualization of structural violence. Consequently, it makes sense that if a given 
society were to minimize or even erase the manipulation and unequal distribution of power, they 
would greatly reduce institutionalized structural violence, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
conflict. 
 To give a pertinent example, we might examine a power imbalance present in Northern 
Ireland that loomed large until relatively recently. Given the presence of a Protestant Unionist 
majority in Northern Ireland, its government was composed predominantly of Protestant 
Unionist. Given Northern Ireland in the twentieth century was led by a predominantly Protestant 
Unionist government, its economic policies were generally favorable to Protestant Unionists. As 
a result of cultural and religious nepotism, Catholic Nationalists were often left with higher rates 
of unemployment than their Protestant Unionist counterparts. While no legislation existed 
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explicitly stating that Catholic Nationalists were second-class citizens, the power structure in 
place prior to and during The Troubles created a situation where many felt like they were. With 
the majority of senior positions in the corporate and political spheres occupied by Protestant 
Unionists, few Catholic Nationalists were left with a means with which they felt could achieve 
upward social mobility. Innocuous at face value, the government set up by a “democratically” 
elected majority implemented structurally violent policies, which magnified related conflicts of 
identity that had been (although somewhat precariously) lying dormant in Northern Ireland for 
nearly half a century. 
 While it may seem relatively obvious to recognize qualities of deeply divided societies 
and relatively straightforward to transform such institutions as the power imbalance Galtung 
calls structural violence, it is necessary to integrate recognition and transformation in the 
historical discussion of The Troubles. Without doing so, we would be doing a disservice to the 
continual development of peace and understanding taking place in Northern Ireland today. 
On Conflict Transformation 
 Conflict transformation theory differentiates itself from modern conceptions of conflict 
resolution. Conflict Resolution in its most basic form is just that. The word “conflict” means to 
clash with another individual or group in virtually any form. Resolution, from the word resolve, 
generally means that a series of actions has subsided for a particular reason. Conflict Resolution 
is a blanket term that encompasses all forms of the end of a conflict (be it temporary or 
permanent). Conflict Transformation serves to describe a much more difficult, novel mode of 
conflict resolution. The Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, a philanthropic organization 
that seeks to promote research and development for effective channels of conflict resolution, 
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offers a concise definition of conflict transformation on their website, stating that conflict 
transformation is 
  …[a] generic, comprehensive term referring to actions and processes seeking to alter the 
various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes 
of a particular conflict over the long term. It aims to transform negative destructive conflict 
into positive constructive conflict and deals with structural, behavioral and attitudinal 
aspects of conflict. The term refers to both the process and the completion of the process. 
As such, it incorporates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution and goes farther than conflict settlement or conflict management (Berghof 
Foundation on Conflict Transformation, October 2011). 
 
Conflict Transformation can effectively promote conflict resolution. But conflict resolution does 
not always mean that a conflict has been transformed. According to Ramsbotham et al (2005), 
the absence of war does not necessarily mean peace (p.42). This idea is perhaps the most 
significant concept shaping conflict transformation theory, as the basic problem Ramsbotham et 
al (2005) posits⎯ that is, the absence of a parallel between lack of visible conflict and peace⎯ 
reflects the reason why efforts at promoting peace have switched from traditional methods of 
conflict resolution to modern methods of conflict transformation. This type of approach to 
peacebuilding has been seen elsewhere in the world besides Northern Ireland. South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconcilliation commission, and small-scale efforts in Rwanda and the Balkans have 
begun to make large-scale results. Rather than put an end to conflicts through new political 
legislation or physical force, “conflict transformation’s field of view is intended to [address] the 
root causes of social conflicts… while recognizing that some conflicts are not resolvable unless 
fundamental arrangements are changed”(Coy, 2009:68). In doing so, conflict transformation 
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aims to reengineer what Michael Polanyi describes as our tacit knowledge of conflict.  (Redekop, 
2002:14). Tacit knowledge is knowledge in its most basic, reflexive form. It is a type of 
knowledge that people are largely unaware of, making it difficult for individuals to critically 
examine it and also transmit it. In essence, tacit knowledge is the knee-jerk reaction ingrained in 
both the individual and the whole. When a young child in school is hit by one of their classmates, 
they more often than not will try and hit back. This is tacit knowledge⎯ our most basic 
understanding of checks and balances.  
 When applied to conflict, our tacit knowledge of social group interaction generally 
dictates that when one group imposes on another ideologically and or physically, it is important 
that the other reasserts its own to counteract this imposition. It is this physical and ideological 
interference that generates what we see as conflict. To highlight a brief example, I turn to the 
events of September 11th, 2001. An act of violence, the events of September 11th cannot be 
condemned enough. But it should also be underscored that a variety of wrongdoings were 
committed on both sides before and after that terrible day in 2001. When the United States 
invaded Afghanistan, it was seen as justified by the majority of the Western World (myself 
included), but the cost to non-affiliated Afghanis has been tremendous. Countless civilians with 
no affiliation with or sympathy for the Taliban or Al Qaeda have been tortured and killed for a 
crime a group of radical extremists committed. Furthermore, the supposed concern of the Bush-
Cheney administration that nearby Iraq was harboring like-minded terrorists involved our 
military to a greater degree in a conflict on foreign soil. It was the tacit knowledge of a national 
collective that generated the instinctual response of a stricken American Government to retaliate 
by invading Afghanistan to ‘’even the score against a dramatically weaker, disorganized fringe 
group of terrorists. Playing off fears generated by the Bush administration’s knee-jerk reaction to 
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invade Afghanistan, the conflict then escalated when American coalition forces were sent to Iraq, 
where they remain, nearly a decade later. The American lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
coupled with the lives of innocent Afghanis and Iraqis have far surpassed the death toll from the 
September 11th attacks, begging us to question whether our tacit knowledge guided us in the 
right direction, or the wrong direction. 
 Conflict Transformation demands that we understand, make explicit, and then question 
our tacit knowledge before we let it govern our interpersonal and political actions. So while the 
symptoms of deep-rooted conflict, such as the events of and subsequent fallout from September 
11th, seem completely an utterly unfounded, they are usually the product of generations of 
misunderstanding (Redekop, 2005:23). Traditional notions of conflict resolution suggest that an 
adequate approach to a resolution to an armed conflict include 1. Defense, 2. Mitigating the 
onslaught of the opponent, and 3. Terminating the conflict by coaxing the opponent to surrender 
or accept a truce through military force and or political maneuvering. Conflict Transformation 
acknowledges that conflict is an undeniable way humans will interact.  Conflict, like all other 
human interaction, is part of the human relational system. Redekop defines a relational system as 
a “context—such as a family, a workplace, or a region in which parties have to deal with one 
another” (Redekop, 2005:12). Because these settings are essentially inevitable in our daily lives, 
it would be foolish to say that conflict is completely avoidable. David Augsberger further 
explains that humanity operates under the preconditions of its culture. In simple terms, 
Augsberger believes that since we are born into a social world, we will always experience 
parallel emotions and interactions to others, i.e. conflict, loss, greed, anger, pleasure, et cetera. 
Solidifying his argument Augsberger cites Foucault, who argues  
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…the Fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of 
perception, its exchanges, its techniques its values, the hierarchy of its practices-- establish 
for all of us, from the very first, the empirical orders with which we will be dealing and 
within which we will be at home (Foucault, 1970:xx as cited by Augsberger 1992:16). 
 
With a background in cultural anthropology and a firm belief in evolutionary anthropology I 
have a predisposition to agree with the notion that conflict is a part of human nature. 
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz once paraphrased in his Interpretation of Cultures, the ideas of 
sociologist Max Weber, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he, himself, has 
spun” (Geertz, 1973). The scope of human interaction, in its many variations, is engineered 
through a process of inevitable social learning. As Michel Foucault argues (and Augsberger 
embraces), there will certainly be ‘codes,’ learned or innate, that human beings will adhere to. 
However, like Redekop and others I believe our natural inclination to conflict can be mitigated to 
a great degree by our ability to think critically. That’s where Conflict Transformation re-enters 
the picture, incorporating an ultimate goal of what Rambsotham et al. (2005) citing Wehr (1979) 
argues is “not to win, but to achieve a fresh level of social truth and a healthier relationship 
between antagonists” (p. 64). In essence, Conflict Transformation leads us to question the 
naturalness of Polanyi’s tacit knowledge, Redekop’s relational systems, and Foucault’s 
fundamental codes of culture. Because the aforementioned concepts are accepted as innate and 
human, they can be plausibly altered.  
 Take for example the tried-and-true example of Gandhi’s non-violent movement in India 
during the 1930s and 1940s. Despite countless civil rights violations and atrocities committed 
under British rule, Gandhi, the political and spiritual leader of the Indian independence 
movement, sought purge the notion of an eye-for-an-eye from the consciousness of his people. 
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Instead of advocating retaliation, which had been up until then a traditional form of conflict, he 
advocated non-violence. Through Gandhi’s nonviolent struggle he proved that conflict through 
nontraditional pathways is possible. A group can alter the way they participate in a ‘natural’ 
action such as conflict by critically engaging the impact of their participation in it. It could be 
argued that if the entire nation of India armed itself against the British Empire and settled in for a 
long war it could have won, but the war might still be going on today—and millions of 
individuals could have died. Instead, Gandhi’s nonviolent movement in India achieved the same 
results, in a fraction of the time, with minimal casualties (on either side). His ability to critically 
gauge the situation in India led to the development of a relatively novel and incredibly effective 
form of resistance. Gandhi’s Satyagraha (his non-violent movement) was not a knee-jerk 
reaction to British oppression. It was the product of his critical analysis of the fallacies of a knee-
jerk response to the British oppression. In Polyani and Redekops eyes, Gandhi’s Satyagraha was 
a product of his critical engagement and subsequent rejection of the tacit knowledge of the 
relational system of British oppression. 
  At this point I feel it important to interject that for the sake of practicality, this research 
project will utilize the ideas of Lederach, Galtung, Redekop, and Augsberger in a historical 
context. I feel that doing this offers a concrete historical example of the relatively abstract 
concepts each author seeks to illuminate. No conflict is static. External influences, internal 
politics, and continual ideological evolution contribute to the dynamic nature of a conflict, and 
thus a history of a conflict should be written acknowledging it as such. The conflict that emerges 
from deeply divided societies, as Lederach posits, should be understood “analytically as a 
progression that moves through different stages” (Lederach 1997:71). The case of The Troubles 
is no different, and so their history should be analyzed through a lens of conflict theory and 
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ultimately Conflict Transformation. The following section of the literature review will examine 
previous histories of Northern Ireland and The Troubles. These histories rely heavily on a fact-
based historical narrative to articulate the trajectory of one of the most violent internal conflicts 
in recent Western European history. They will serve as a juxtaposition of the transformational 
history of The Troubles, which creates the body of this thesis. 
On The Troubles 
  In 1801, Ireland and Great Britain were formally joined as the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland. When this act was passed, the Britishness of the island of Ireland was 
questionable, but British socioeconomic hegemony was concrete (Hennessey 1997:1). With little 
success, Irish nationalists attempted to extricate themselves from the socioeconomic and 
geographic confines they felt the United Kingdom imposed on them. The establishment of Irish 
cultural organizations such as the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) in 1884 and the Gaelic 
League (founded by Douglas Hyde) in 1893 marked the beginning of a revival of Irish 
nationalism, but it wasn’t until Easter, 1916 that winds of change began to fill the sails of the 
nationalist cause. The nationalist rebellion known as the ‘Easter Rising’ in 1916 provoked an ill-
planned reaction by the preoccupied (by WWI) British Government. By executing the Rising’s 
nationalist leaders, the British catalyzed a phenomenal change in attitude amongst a formerly 
apolitical population. Kevin Kelley’s historical analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
supports this conclusion, arguing, “England, employing its usual vengeance against Irish traitors 
to the Crown, had this time made a gross miscalculation. Ireland was sullen, anguished, 
unbowed. In death, the Republican Volunteers were transformed from foolish extremists into 
martyred heroes of the Irish Republic.” (Kelley, 1982:33). With growing support for the 
nationalist cause, militant ideological conflict began to develop. In 1917, wracked by the plague 
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of World War One, the British government sought to impose conscription in Ireland. This was 
met with tremendous opposition from a growing nationalist community. As their leaders were 
swiftly executed after the 1916 Rising, members of the nationalist movement found it difficult to 
see eye-to-eye with the British government on the subject of conscription. This disagreement 
carried over into the general elections of 1918, when republican Sinn Fein, a party whose name 
means “Ourselves Alone,” virtually swept the polls, earning a total of seventy three of Ireland’s 
one hundred and five seats in British Parliament. (Hennessey, 1997:8). In a seemingly 
monumental victory, Sinn Fein took a calculated risk by choosing not abstain from taking their 
seats in British Parliament and proclaiming a new Irish Republic, known in Gaelic as ‘Dáil 
Éireann.’  
 At this point, it appears Sinn Fein’s decision to abstain from taking their seats in 
Westminster was somewhat of a blunder. Recognizing the long-lasting implications of a direct 
affront to British hegemony, the British passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, which 
expanded the implications of the home rule legislation passed some years before. Because 
nationalist-minded Sinn Fein MPs refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the parliament they 
had been newly elected to, the subsequent parliamentary discussions at Westminster were left to 
the Unionists. As a result, the Government of Ireland act of 1920 was passed. This Act provided 
that there be two parliaments on the island of Ireland, one in Ulster, where a majority of Ireland’s 
Unionists resided, and the other in what would later (briefly) become known as ‘Southern 
Ireland.’ The subsequent Anglo-Irish war (also known as the Irish war of Independence) 
culminated in the passage of a treaty that acknowledged the sovereignty of both parliaments and 
gave both the autonomy to choose where their allegiance lay. The Dáil in the south, though 
unified on secession from the United Kingdom was split on the issue of partition. The parliament 
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in the North, dominated by Unionist MPs, opted to remain in the United Kingdom. This 
effectively split the island of Ireland along the lines of sociopolitical and religious ideology. In 
the South, the heavily Catholic, Nationalist majority became part of the Irish Free State. In the 
North, the presence of a British Unionist (Protestant) majority and Irish Nationalist (Catholic) 
minority in the North would eventually give rise to a bloody thirty year period of politico-
religious conflict known colloquially as “The Troubles.” 
 In Northern Ireland, insurgency against the British Crown was not unheard of in the years 
after partition, however it was dealt with swiftly and went comparatively unnoticed until it 
erupted on the international stage in the late 1960s. While there is no set date as to when The 
Troubles commenced and when they finished (or even if they have finished), the colloquial title 
‘The Troubles’ generally signifies a thirty-year period between October 1968 (The Derry Civil 
Rights March) and April 1998 (the approval of the groundbreaking Belfast Agreement). During 
this period approximately 3500 individuals (civilian, military, and paramilitary) were killed. 
 Irish historian and University College, Cork professor J.J. Lee (1989) offers an 
explanation for the development of a heightened state of conflict in Northern Ireland, 
highlighting economic downturn in the post-World War II years (1945-1963). As the rest of 
Great Britain enjoyed relatively steady growth during this period, Northern Ireland was not 
invited to the party. Catholics were hit hard during this period, mired in economic purgatory with 
an absurd 17.3% unemployment rate. Comparatively, Protestants maintained a lower rate of 
employment, with only 6.6% unemployed during the same period (1971) (Lee, 1989:412). Lee, 
writing in the late 1980s, acknowledges these statistics should be noted in a discussion as to what 
internal factors unique to the late 1960s catalyzed the onset of The Troubles. But he leaves any 
further speculation as to the significance of these figures to the reader.  
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 As The Troubles progressed, they took a tremendous toll on the people of Northern 
Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and mainland Britain. Paramilitary violence was all too 
common. Bombings occurred frequently and were to be expected on any day of any month, of 
any year. Political disagreements, riotous protests, sectarian discrimination, hunger strikes, and 
failed cease fires lasted for thirty years. But in 1998, a groundbreaking peace agreement, known 
as the Belfast Agreement, was voted on and passed into law. Save for a comparatively small 
amount of sectarian violence, The Troubles have largely dissipated in the years following this 
agreement. While the heyday of paramilitary violence has come and largely gone, stark political 
divides still exist in Northern Ireland. This is because Northern Ireland, like many other conflict 
zones, is a politico-geographic region whose existence is still hotly contested. Historically, the 
prevailing political discourse in Northern Ireland (Nationalist versus Unionist) is predicated upon 
conceptions of internal and external national allegiance and religious preference. (Hayward 
2006). Contemporarily, the prevailing political harmony in Northern Ireland is predicated on a 
recognized commitment by these two conflicting ideologies to work together (power sharing 
agreement as set forth by the Belfast Agreement). The very foundations of the current system of 
government in Northern Ireland reify the presence of two conflicting ideologies while 
simultaneously acknowledging that they can work together in the interest of the people of 
Northern Ireland.  
 I have consciously chosen to omit individual historical analyses of each of the topics I 
will specifically discuss in chapter four in the literature review. This is because the historical 
discussion offered by the likes of Lee, Hennessey, Kelley and others will be synthesized with the 
theory set forth by Lederach, Augsberger, Redekop, Galtung, Foucault and others. In essence, 
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the body of this thesis will combine the two branches of academic discourse presented in this 
literature review⎯ conflict theory and political history. 
3. Methodology 
 This paper is qualitative in nature. The ‘data’ collected in the following chapter is an 
amalgamation of primary documents, newspaper articles, radio and television reports, and 
historical analysis. These sources are then framed with theories presented in conflict studies with 
the ultimate goal of explaining how Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland occurred over 
the course of The Troubles.  
Method of Research: Textual Analysis 
 To build a ‘frame’ for the thesis of this paper, in this case the political history of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland through a lens conflict theory, I read a work on conflict theory, 
dealing with a spread of topics including peacebuilidng, violence, Conflict Transformation, 
reconciliation, and divided societies. This was important because I needed to have a sound 
understanding of the various expressions of, reactions to, and theories behind conflict and 
Conflict Transformation. Using a basic framework of Conflict Transformation, I built upon my 
argument by reading and analyzing historical texts of The Troubles. Finally, I searched for 
newspaper accounts, official statements, primary documents, and television and radio broadcasts 
to fill in what the academic historical record leaves out.  
Methodology  
 Gleaning information from historical texts, primary documents, newspaper articles, and 
various other media releases had a twofold importance to the project. First and foremost, each 
text contributed to a more complete understanding of The Troubles. In addition, the different 
presentation style of each text painted a different story of The Troubles. Historical texts often 
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came across as overly brief and unemotional. Conversely, primary documents (i.e. actual text of 
peace agreements) and official statements conveyed the aspirations of the upper echelons of the 
political realm, which ranged from disgust to hope and solidarity. Newspaper articles covered the 
spectrum as well, with pictures and bold lettered print that often sought to capture the emotions 
of a nation ranging from shock and condemnation to cautious optimism. As outlined earlier, the 
goal of this thesis is to provide a more three-dimensional analysis of The Troubles in order to 
better understand the evolution of the sociopolitical landscape in Northern Ireland. 
 In the following pages, you will be presented with almost thirty years of both primary and 
secondary reports of The Troubles. Each section is formatted the same. First, an introduction 
outlines the event or topic and how it pertains to the evolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
by using a specific dimension of conflict theory. Next a presentation of primary sources follows, 
unsurprisingly found under the title Primary. The content in this section varies from event to 
event, some with a wide range of primary documents and some with just newspaper headlines. 
The purpose of this section is to present raw data, more often than not, from within twenty-four 
hours of the event in question occurring. This information is valuable in helping to grasp the ebb 
and flow of emotions over the course of The Troubles, something that is often left out of 
traditional historical analysis. Then, there is an analysis of academic history of The Troubles, 
aptly titled Academic. This section compiles various excerpts from historical texts as they pertain 
to the event or topic in question. This information is used as a contrast to the primary sources, as 
it is often written months or years after-the-fact, with the benefit of hindsight. The next section 
Synthesis, integrates both Primary and Academic with conflict theory, in order to locate each 
event on the spectrum of Conflict Transformation. While the majority of the paper is written in a 
chronological fashion, section 4.3 is details events that occur in the midst of the events of section 
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4.2. This is because this paper is designed to build off of the theories presented in the previous 
section. As you are reading, you will find that the conflict theory discussed in section 4.4 is 
predicated upon recognition of theories presented in 4.3 and so on and so forth. 
Chapter IV 
 Data and Findings 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a growing body of work on conflict theory 
and more specifically Conflict Transformation Theory. While contemporary Conflict 
Transformation Theory generally serves as a framework for addressing future and continuing 
conflicts, this paper uses Conflict Transformation theory and applies it to a political history, in 
hopes of illustrating a process of conflict evolution—a process of gradual change over time 
brought about by changing political and social tides. This is a concept that I believe is important 
to understanding both the history and the future trajectory of all conflict.  
 Traditional histories of The Troubles read much like a timeline, with a focus on dates, 
politicians, and events. Anthropologies of The Troubles, though not unheard of, are relatively 
uncommon. This section of the research project examines numerous transformative events of 
The Troubles that span from shortly after their onset in 1968 to spring of 1998. The data in this 
section will be presented with a summary of the event or topic first, followed by a presentation of 
primary sources (including newspaper articles, personal testaments, interview transcripts, and 
government documents). These are juxtaposed by the use of an analysis of a range of political 
histories of The Troubles. From there, I will utilize concepts of conflict theory to illustrate how 
the conflict in Northern Ireland escalated, evolved, dissipated and ultimately transformed 
through active and passive internal and external forces. 
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Brahm (2003) uses a curve to model the trajectory of modern conflict  
 
 
 
4.1 Conflict Emerges in a Deeply Divided Society: The Northern Ireland Riots of 1969, 
Internment, and Bloody Sunday  
 
 In the half century following partition, Northern Ireland managed to maintain a 
semblance of peace. However, as the last remaining part of the United Kingdom on the island of 
Ireland, the political system in Northern Ireland echoed the sentiments of the Ulster Covenant. 
Signed by Ulster Unionists in 1912, it expressed the desire of a large population of Ulster 
Protestants to remain in the United Kingdom and adamantly opposed Home Rule. Those who did 
not sign included a significant minority of Ulster Catholics, faithful to the idea of a sovereign, 
United Ireland. Over subsequent generations, discriminatory sectarian policies began to dominate 
the cultural and political arena in Northern Ireland, further entrenching the country’s population 
in the narrative that Northern Ireland is, as Lederach (1997) describes, a deeply divided society, 
with distinct units of cultural, religious, and political identity. While comparatively small-scale 
civil rights protests and occasional acts of sectarian violence were not uncommon prior to in the 
half-century following partition, they became commonplace after the onset of the Northern 
Ireland Riots in 1969. Between January of 1969 and the months following Bloody Sunday in 
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January of 1972, the conflict in Northern Ireland erupted on the international stage, setting in 
motion a tumultuous thirty years that saw discrimination, violence, governmental change, and 
eventually ground-breaking peace agreements. 
4.1a Northern Ireland Riots of 1969 
 
 In the late 1960s several civil rights movements sprung up in Northern Ireland to protest 
unfair housing legislation, police brutality, and sectarian discrimination. The civil rights 
movement was led by the appropriately named Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
(NICRA), which, beginning in 1969, launched a series of marches primarily in opposition to the 
absence of a one-man-one-vote policy in Northern Ireland. A somewhat outdated system of 
franchise, voters in Northern Ireland were required to be property owners. This was an issue for a 
large portion of Catholics in Northern Ireland, as they mostly fell in the lower-middle and lower 
class brackets of the socioeconomic ladder in Northern Ireland. Despite the fact that Catholics 
possessed nearly 40% of the overall population in Northern Ireland, they were blatantly 
misrepresented at Stormont, with Protestant hegemony drowning out calls for political reform. 
As riots broke out in 1969, the opposition’s response was unexpectedly brutal, radicalizing much 
of the Catholic population across Northern Ireland and repulsing those in the Republic of Ireland. 
Primary 
Burntollet Ambush 
 When a Northern Ireland civil rights group called People’s Democracy staged a march 
from Belfast to Derry in January of 1969, they were attacked at Burntollet Bridge outside of 
Derry. Controversially, the Royal Ulster Constabulary did nothing to intervene in the ambush. 
Conflicting reports suggest RUC members even partook in the assault on marchers. Following 
the assault on People’s Democracy protesters at Burntollet Bridge, the Irish Times headline read: 
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“O’NEILL MAY CALL UP SPECIAL POLICE. PREMIER WARNS ‘WARRING 
MINORITIES.’ PARTISANSHIP OF R.U.C. BECOMES THE BONE OF CONTENTION” 
(The Irish Times, January 6, 1969). People’s Democracy marchers were ambushed three times in 
the last 10 miles of their journey, and approximately three hundred people were injured. At the 
root of the Nationalist outcry, the article states, was that police forces following the march “were 
partisan in dealing with demonstrations.” Consequently, civil rights protesters declared an end to 
any form of ‘truce’ in Northern Ireland. 
Battle of The Bogside 
 A Unionist march on August 12th near the Bogside neighborhood of Derry caused 
consternation amongst a large population of objecting Catholics who began attacking marchers 
as they approached the Bogside in Derry. Contrary to the Burntollet ambush, the RUC intervened 
this time, beginning a pivotal skirmish known colloquially as the ‘Battle of the Bogside.’ In 
describing the events of the day, the Irish Times went with the headline: “TEAR-GAS USED 
ON DERRY RIOTERS: 112 CASUALTIES AS POLICE BATTLE BOGSIDE BARRICADES” 
(The Irish Times, August 13, 1969). The article describes the general state of anarchy present in 
the Bogside during the riots. It continues, “[i]n Derry a force of 1,000 policemen charged and 
countercharged Catholic youths who rained stones and petrol bombs on them….” A neighboring 
article on the front page of the Irish Times cites RUC officials as stating that the riots in the 
Bogside appeared to have been premeditated by local residents who used “hundreds of petrol-
bombs… [that] must have been prepared in advance” (Irish Times, August 13, 1969). News of 
violence towards Irish Catholics in the Bogside generated concern in the Republic of 
Ireland⎯concern, which Irish Taoiseach Jack Lynch famously articulated on national television 
in the Republic of Ireland. 
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Lynch’s Response to the Riots in Northern Ireland 
 On August 13th Irish Taoiseach Jack Lynch delivered a televised address to the people of 
the Republic of Ireland directed at the British Government. The speech, colloquially referenced 
to now as Lynch’s “We will not stand by…” Address, implores the British Government to apply 
for a United Nations peacekeeping force to manage the rapidly escalating conflict in Northern 
Ireland. In solidarity with the sentiments of Catholics and Nationalists in Northern Ireland, 
Lynch acknowledges, “the RUC is no longer accepted as an impartial police force…”(Lynch, 
1969). Lynch’s statements were seen as a direct affront to the decision making process in 
Northern Ireland, where Prime Minister James Chichester-Clarke had been contemplating 
requesting the deployment of the British military to resolve the situation in Northern Ireland. 
 Lynch also proposed that the British Government and Stormont actively consider 
reassessing the constitutional status of the six counties in Northern Ireland, stating because “the 
reunification of the national territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it 
is [the Irish Government’s] intention to request the British Government to enter into early 
negotiations with the Irish government to review the present constitutional position of… 
Northern Ireland”(Lynch, 1969). To some Unionists in Northern Ireland Lynch’s speech was 
viewed as a threat of invasion of Northern Ireland by the Republic of Ireland. While it contained 
strong words of disapproval, it can be assumed Lynch understood that an invasion of Northern 
Ireland by an underprepared and numerically inferior Irish military would be highly impractical. 
(A complete transcript of Lynch’s speech can be found in appendix1.1) 
1969: A Year That Changed Everything 
 A December 31st, 1969 article in the London Times eerily prophesized the forthcoming 
Troubles in Northern Ireland. The article, titled, “OLD QUARRELS IN A NEW GUISE,” leads 
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with a somewhat ominous opening sentence, the article argues “[n]othing will be the same in 
Northern Ireland after 1969, one of the most critical of all the crisis years in Irish history” 
(London Times, December 31, 1969). The article describes the escalation of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland from bricks to bullets in a matter of months. Almost like dominos, the riots of 
1969 led to the collapse of any semblance of order in Northern Ireland.  The tone of the article is 
relatively subdued, as it aims merely to summarize the events of the year in Northern Ireland, 
rather than necessarily lead its readers towards any conclusions other than their own. If anything, 
the article highlights the uncertainty that dominated the political arena in Ulster at the time. 
Following a brief description of the resignation of minister of commerce, Brian Faulkner, Prime 
Minister Captain Terrence O’Neill held a general election, which, though dominated by 
Unionists, displayed massive ideological fragmentation in the Unionist population. The 
fragmentation of the Unionist population was juxtaposed by the growing coalescence of the 
Nationalist cause. As civil rights were continually violated, demands were not met, and the RUC 
continued to turn the other cheek, political unrest grew in Catholic areas, culminating in the 
Battle of the Bogside in August of 1969 and the subsequent arrival of British troops. The 
Troubles had officially begun.  
 Academic 
 Much like the ‘year in review’-style article in the London Times, the historical literature 
on 1969 in Northern Ireland suggests that the events of the year did change everything. Civil 
rights marches in early 1969 greatly exposed the sectarian nature of the RUC. They also placed 
the plight of Catholics in Northern Ireland on the international stage to a degree unmatched by 
efforts in years prior. The events of 1969 saw an increase in paramilitary recruitment and thus 
paramilitary violence, thereby generating international concern evidenced by Lynch’s assertion 
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that Great Britain should apply for a U.N. peacekeeping force, Chichester-Clark’s refusal, and 
the eventual arrival of British troops in Northern Ireland for the first time since the 1920s. 
 Irish historian J.J. Lee offers a candid explanation of the tumultuous developments of 
1969. While he highlights the legitimacy of the cause of the People’s Democracy march in 
January of 1969, he makes note of their decision to march through protestant territories in Derry 
during the last ten miles of the march for which they were “duly assaulted at Burntollet, with the 
complicity of the police, and apparently the participation of individual policemen” (Lee, 
1989:422). Not only was the RUC was an overwhelmingly Protestant police force, Lee (1989) 
notes that the RUC was also the only armed general police force in the United Kingdom. General 
police forces in England, Wales, and Scotland were (for the most part) unarmed. Additionally, 
the Garda Síochána of the Republic of Ireland was also an unarmed police force. As they were 
responsible for patrolling a hotly contested geographic region, the RUC being the only armed 
general police force in the United Kingdom is relatively unsurprising. What should be 
acknowledged at this juncture is the amount of power entrusted to a firearm-carrying police 
force. The RUC was under intense pressure from all sides of the sociopolitical arena. To 
Stormont, they were responsible for maintaining law and order so that Westminster would not 
have to intervene in the day-to-day operations of Northern Ireland. To Unionists, the RUC was a 
police force tasked with a difficult job of protecting the interests of the people of Northern 
Ireland in the name of the Queen. To Nationalists, the RUC was the was a biased police force 
that turned a blind eye when it came to protecting Catholics from violence in Northern Ireland. 
 As violence escalated, a slough of bombings occurred on April 23, 1969. Originally 
thought to be the work of the IRA, the bombings were later attributed to the Ulster Volunteer 
force (UVF), a Loyalist paramilitary group. These bombings were part of the UVF’s somewhat 
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cannibalistic political goal of destabilizing the Government of Northern Ireland, led by Terrence 
O’Neill, whom they felt was too reform-minded for Protestant Ulster. It appears as though 
O’Neill was stuck between a rock and a hard place as his reforms were viewed as meaningless to 
disenfranchised Catholics (Hennessey, 1997:161-162). The riots of 1969 generated internal 
fragmentation in the Unionist camp as Prime Minister O’Neill’s decision to investigate the 
abuses at Burntollet triggered the resignation of dissenting cabinet member Brian Faulkner. With 
a call for general elections, the fragmentation in Northern Unionism became readily apparent. 
Lee writes, “little at this stage could have prevailed against a resurgence of sectarian sentiment 
and the virtually total polarization of the two ethnic groups in Northern Ireland” (Lee, 1989:424). 
With both Catholics and Protestants failing to see eye to eye, as well as internal disarray among a 
conflicted Unionist population, the political environment in Northern Ireland rapidly heated up in 
1969, ultimately exposing for the first time in decades, the truly divided nature of Northern 
Ireland’s sociopolitical landscape.  
Synthesis 
 The events of 1969 suggest that the political system in Northern Ireland was far from 
perfect during the years following partition. Still, why was it that 1969 was the year in which a 
relatively dormant conflict became quite active? Lederach’s work on deeply divided societies 
offers some suggestions, in the form of characteristics of deeply divided societies like Northern 
Ireland.   
 The most noticeable marker of the divided nature of the sociopolitical realm in Northern 
Ireland is the fact that the conflict in question (in 1969) was “lodged in long-standing 
relationships” (Lederach, 1997:14). Opposing parties of the conflict in Northern Ireland had 
lived side-by-side for generations. In fact, the Apprentice Boys march that provoked the Battle of 
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the Bogside was to commemorate the Relief of Derry, which occurred some three hundred years 
earlier. Catholics and Protestants have shared the geographic territory in Northern Ireland for 
centuries, and while clashes were not uncommon, they were often accepted as an inevitable part 
of Northern Irish life. Like a volcano lying dormant, calls for political change and equal rights 
falling on deaf ears meant that frustrations were bound to erupt into violent conflict⎯and they 
most certainly did in 1969. 
 Furthermore, increasing fragmentation of social groups in Northern Ireland along ethnic 
and sectarian lines of identity exposed of the fallacies of the state’s political system. While 
Catholic civil rights protesters began to unite against disenfranchisement by Stormont, Unionist 
hegemony began to crack. Lederach argues that in deeply divided societies, “people seek 
security in increasingly smaller and narrower identity groups” (Lederach, 1997:13). The assault 
on civil rights marchers at Burntollet exemplifies this phenomenon quite well. As unified 
Catholic indignation unsettled the Protestant-favorable status quo in Northern Ireland, the 
supposedly impartial but virtually entirely Protestant, RUC acted along sectarian lines as rather 
than honoring professional obligations (even though they may have not seen it that way at the 
time). Viewing the Catholic march as a direct affront to their Protestantism, on duty RUC 
members turned a blind eye while their fellow off duty compatriots participated in the Burntollet 
assault.  
 What came in the following months was an escalation of violence by paramilitaries on 
both sides of the conflict and the emergence of the mentality that Lederach (1997) describes as, 
“if we do not dominate, we will be dominated” (p.15). The battle between Bogside Catholics and 
the RUC during the Battle of the Bogside represented another turning point in 1969, as the 
inability of Northern Ireland to assume control of its warring people provoked two key events. 
  31 
The first was Jack Lynch’s stern statement of the Irish Republic’s disapproval of the inability of 
Northern Ireland security forces to stop the violence. In his statement, Lynch also reasserted the 
firm belief of the Republic of Ireland that the reunification of the island of Ireland was the proper 
solution to the violence in the North. Furthermore, Lynch appealed to the British government to 
request a neutral UN peacekeeping force to be deployed to conflict areas in Northern Ireland in 
an attempt to restore order. 
 Northern Ireland’s penultimate Prime Minister, James Chichester-Clark was relatively 
unmoved by Lynch’s demands, acting in line with Lederach’s assertion that “the international 
community’s ability to respond [to intranational conflict] is limited” (Lederach, 1997:18). 
Consequently, Chichester-Clark requested that the British Government deploy troops to Northern 
Ireland to settle the situation in the Bogside—they did so, temporarily. An unforeseen 
consequence of the presence of British troops’ arrival was the creation of Nationalist controlled 
“no-go” areas, which were patrolled by Nationalist paramilitaries who forcibly blocked the entry 
of British patrols. These no-go areas in Derry further support Lederach’s claim that in deeply 
divided societies, individuals (in this case nationalists) seek security from within. In just a matter 
of months the political divide in Northern Ireland had evolved from stone throwing to what was 
essentially a war zone. The disturbances of 1969 were not a product of IRA or UVF provocation, 
but a complex mix of “communal disturbances” arising from a “complex political, social, and 
economic situation” in Northern Ireland (Scarman, 1969:2.4). While Unionists have remained in 
power to this day, the fragmentation of their political platform in 1969 stoked the flames of the 
Catholic civil rights movement. As we will learn in the next section, the emergence of the 
Catholic civil rights movement in 1969 would contribute to a new wave of marches, conflict, and 
controversy, culminating in one of the most pivotal events of The Troubles—Bloody Sunday. 
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4.1b Internment and Bloody Sunday 
 Despite a ban established by Northern Ireland’s Parliament at Stormont on all forms of 
protest marches, civil rights protesters (mostly nationalists) gathered for a march on January 30th, 
1972 in the Bogside area of Derry city. The march was organized to protest a controversial 
security measure enacted by Stormont called Operation Demetrius, known colloquially as 
‘Internment,’ which had been implemented four months prior in August of 1971. A matter of 
hours after the march began, 13 civilians were dead (a fourteenth died some months later due to 
injuries sustained that day). All fourteen individuals were shot dead by the high-powered rifles of 
the 1st Battalion of the British Army’s Parachute Regiment. While bystanders reported hearing 
only the sound of British Army gunfire, initial reports and statements released by the British 
Government maintained that the “Paras” (British Paratroopers) were fired on first. The events of 
Bloody Sunday should be highlighted not simply because they were shocking, but because they 
serve as a barometer of the degree of destructiveness of The Troubles during their early years. 
Bloody Sunday, because of the sheer volume of international and domestic support for the 
Nationalist cause in Northern Ireland it drummed up, is the foremost polarizing event of The 
Troubles in the early 1970s. 
Primary  
 In the days and months following Bloody Sunday, numerous testimonies and statements 
were released as to how the events of January 30th transpired. The following is a collection of 
what I have termed “Primary Reports” or non-academic primary sources that detail the events of 
Bloody Sunday. It is important to acknowledge the presence of personal or media bias in these 
sources.  
Video 
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 A January 30th, 1972 BBC News clip shows a montage of the events of Bloody Sunday. 
The first portion of the video depicts marchers moving slowly en masse along the road. At one 
point, protesters appear to throw stones. Shortly after explosions, the sound of live rounds being 
discharged can be heard over quiet, whirring audio interference. Around midway through the 
video, an unidentified individual can be heard shouting “Murderers! You Bastards!” The video 
cuts to footage of what became an iconic image of Bloody Sunday, that of Father Edward Daly 
and several others carrying the lifeless body of John “Jacky” Duddy (one of the fatalities of the 
day) through an alleyway while simultaneously waving a blood stained white flag. Following 
this, more gunfire is heard as well as footage of British troops maneuvering about the Bogside. 
The footage then cuts to interviews (See appendix 1.2 for full transcript of the news clip) 
 Presented in the film are two narratives of the events of Bloody Sunday. The first is that 
of Catholic priest, Father Edward Daly. Daly’s testament is at the very least representative of the 
perceived innocence of the civil rights protesters. A photo of Daly and a cohort of presumable 
bystanders carrying the lifeless body of Jacky Duddy is one of the most prominent images of the 
day, having been reproduced quite frequently. Today, the image has been replicated on a wall of 
one of the homes in the Bogside, adding to an already rich collection of nationalist artwork in 
Northern Ireland. Daly’s testimony that the actions of the British army were “outrageous” and 
“disgraceful” quite accurately represents the feelings of numerous observers sympathetic to the 
nationalist cause. 
 Conversely, statements made by General Robert Ford, commander of British Land Forces 
in Northern Ireland, paint a much different picture, suggesting that the environment was an 
incredibly dangerous one for the highly armed British soldiers. While Daly questions how the 
Paras can call themselves an army, General Ford calmly and confidently asserts that his men 
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acted responsibly and “did not open up until they had been fired at.” He goes on to further 
establish that the British army would not have had to “restore law and order” if the “hooligan 
element” didn’t take over the order of the protest. 
 In the weeks and months following Bloody Sunday, the contrasting stories of Father Daly 
and General Ford remained major points of contention, with Nationalists and even some 
Unionists calling the events of the day a massacre. Of course, how individuals viewed Bloody 
Sunday was often directly correlated to their political views. To make matters worse, official 
statements further served to polarize both angry and fearful citizens of Northern Ireland, the 
United Kingdom in general, and the Republic of Ireland. 
Audio 
 The following is an official UPI (United Press International) audio service transmission, 
presented by William L. Rukeyser, which detailed the events of Bloody Sunday. Rukeyser was 
an American freelance reporter living in Belfast in the early 1970s. Rukeyser narrates, 
 …a number of civilians have been killed by the British army during the city’s 
(Londonderry) worst day of violence. The day started with a peaceful, but illegal march in 
which about 20,000 people took part. When the march reached an army barricade near the 
city center, troops used tear gas and a water cannon. The shooting started while the 
marchers were retreating. The army claims snipers started the shooting but army fire was 
far heavier and was directed at civilians. Besides those killed, many more people were 
injured.  
 
 --William L. Rukeyser, Londonderry, Northern Ireland 
                                   Wednesday, February 2nd, 1972. 
 
Statements 
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 Stormont, the British Military, the British Legal System, the Irish Government, and local 
politicians released official statements addressing the events of Bloody Sunday. The following is 
a collection of excerpts from official statements released following Bloody Sunday. 
 The ‘Widgery Report’ was among the most controversial of official statements formally 
released after Bloody Sunday. Lord Widgery was appointed by the British Government to 
oversee an investigation of both the actions of the British army and the deceased civilians on 
January 30th, 1972. After weeks of investigation, including the testimony of 114 eyewitnesses 
(Rucker, 2002:97), Widgery’s report was released on April 10th 1972. Controversially, it 
exonerated all British soldiers of any wrongdoings, which infuriated Nationalist sympathizers 
and undermined the credibility of the British government’s management of the quickly escalating 
Troubles. Widgery’s report was lambasted by both nationalist and non-nationalist supporters 
alike, who felt that the report was hastily compiled and did little to place guilt upon the shoulders 
of those who fired live rounds into crowds of protesters. Widgery concludes with several key 
points, which I have included in appendix 1.3 
 Widgery’s report was not well received by Nationalists, who felt it severely downplayed 
the atrocities of the day. While prior injustices of The Troubles could be attributed to 
paramilitaries on both sides, deaths on Bloody Sunday were attributed to a recognized, state-
sponsored, military force. The British army entered Northern Ireland in some years earlier in an 
effort to restore order to a region where anarchy was beginning to take control. The events of 
Bloody Sunday changed the mindset of many Nationalists from a position of ambivalence 
towards the British army to radical opposition. To pour salt on an open wound, the government-
directed Widgery inquiry produced questionable conclusions as to where guilt lay, further 
provoking an already deeply concerned nationalist population in Northern Ireland. 
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 On the Nationalist side, political figures in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
expressed disgust at the actions of the British troops. Bernadette Devlin a nationalist, and then 
the youngest MP at Stormont voiced her sentiments about Bloody Sunday, decrying “[n]o body 
shot at the paratroopers but somebody will shortly, … I have a right as a representative in this 
house who is an eyewitness to ask a question of that of a murdering hypocrite” (Coogan, 
1997:136). Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland Jack Lynch issued an immediate statement of 
disapproval (to put it lightly), echoing the feelings of Nationalists across the Island of Ireland. 
The statement read: 
 …I’m appalled and stunned that British soldiers should shoot indiscriminately into a crowd 
of peacefully demonstrating civilians, resulting in the deaths of  (ten) young men [Lynch 
had been misinformed of the total number of casualties at the time he released the 
statement.] (Lynch, Statement Following Bloody Sunday, Jan 30st, 1972). 
 
Newspapers 
 Newspapers were quick to release reports of the events of Bloody Sunday, many of 
which included eyewitness accounts and personal testimonies. The following are excerpts from 
two separate reports on Bloody Sunday, one by Simon Winchester of The Guardian, a UK-based 
publication. The other report is by Dick Grogan and Martin Crowley of The Irish Times. Both 
excerpts are from the January 31st edition of their respective papers and unilaterally deplore the 
actions of British troops but also acknowledge the presence of potential nationalist paramilitary 
involvement, highlighting heightened tensions in Northern Ireland that had been lingering since 
the outset of the 1969 riots some three years earlier. 
 Upon immediate examination of both papers, the most striking difference to me is the 
leading headline of both papers. The Guardian, a British paper leads with “13 KILLED AS 
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PARATROOPS BREAK RIOT.” (The Guardian, January 31st, 1972) At first glance, word 
selection is already readily apparent in framing the Winchester story. Despite the fact that 
Winchester’s piece does not seem to be slanted in either direction, when compared with the 
leading headline of Irish Times story “SOLDIERS KILL 13 IN BOGSIDE” (Irish Times, 
January 31st, 1972), Winchester’s headline does, in fact, frame the story differently. By using the 
words “break riot” The Guardian implants an initial impression that the British army was acting, 
though recklessly, in line with their orders—after all the civil rights march had been deemed 
illegal by Stormont. It must be made clear however, that the content of Winchester’s article does 
not appear to be biased in anyway towards either side, merely projecting the events of the day as 
he felt they unfolded. Instead, it is the initial wording of the headline that shines a more 
favorable light on the British army. 
 Both newspapers project a general feeling of disapproval of the actions by British 
soldiers. Next to Grogan and Crowley’s article is a short blurb titled “The Sharpeville Massacre.” 
This piece, while not explicitly calling Bloody Sunday a massacre, describes the events of two 
prominent massacres of the twentieth century, Apartheid South Africa’s Sharpeville Massacre in 
1960 and India’s Amritsar Massacre in 1919. These two events dramatically altered the course of 
civil rights movements in South Africa and India, and both are commonly referenced as turning 
points in conflict. Winchester goes as far to mention Sharpeville in his story, marking that “the 
streets had all the appearance of the aftermath of a Sharpeville.”  
 Regardless of their intention, official statements by government officials and legal 
investigators, television reports, radio broadcasts, photographs, and newspapers were integral in 
shaping public opinion of the events of Bloody Sunday. For many previously politically neutral 
or apathetic individuals, Bloody Sunday was a polarizing event. For those already firmly 
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entrenched in either encampment of the nascent Troubles, initial reports by the media, 
government officials, and subsequently released legal inquiries simply fomented an already 
blatant political divide between Nationalists and Unionists as well as Catholics and Protestants, 
further fueling escalation of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. 
Academic 
 By implementing a policy of Internment, the government of Northern Ireland drew heavy 
criticism from its Nationalist population. While the outwardly stated goal of Internment was to 
combat a growing trend of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland that had been steadily 
increasing since the late 1960s (Hennessey, 1997:193), the reality of Internment was quite 
different. Aside from the questionable authority it gave the RUC to raid nationalist (although 
Coogan 1997, notes that this essentially meant Catholic) homes at all hours of the day, it also 
enabled law enforcement officials to hold prisoners for an extended period of time without trial. 
In addition to implementing Internment, Brian Faulkner, then Prime Minister of Northern 
Ireland, had announced heightened security measures that gave British troops and RUC members 
special authoritative powers. As the civil rights march that took place on Bloody Sunday was 
expected to go on as planned (despite its illegal nature), British troops and law enforcement 
officials were dispatched to the area in droves, armed with both rubber and lead bullets, the stage 
was set for what would be arguably the most divisive day of in the thirty year history of The 
Troubles. 
Internment and Bloody Sunday 
 The riots of 1969 proved that Nationalists and Unionists were clearly at odds, divided 
along the lines of religious affiliation and political ideology. Already underrepresented in 
Stormont, Catholics found themselves being unfairly targeted during midnight arrest raids geared 
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at arresting and interning (without trial) Republican paramilitaries. Robin Evelegh, former 
Colonel in the British Army and author of Peace-keeping in a Democratic Society: Lessons from 
Northern Ireland, describes the social and psychological impact of these raids on the catholic 
community in Northern Ireland, explaining that “… a mother who has had soldiers breaking up 
her home and incidentally terrifying her children at 3 am is unlikely to wish to help the 
government” (Evelegh, 1978:70). These raids were not entirely uncommon either, as Faulkner’s 
Internment policy led to 17,262 home searches and or raids in 1971 alone” (Lee, 1989:433). The 
raids were relatively unfruitful in achieving their established aims, according to Lee (1989), as 
much of the information used by the British military and the RUC was speculative at best. One 
thing these raids were incredibly effective at was antagonizing a Catholic population. 
Consequently, enraged Nationalist paramilitary organizations escalated their armed campaign 
following the implementation of Internment in August of 1971. While the total number of 
Troubles-related casualties in 1971 prior to the beginning of Internment on August 9th is 32, 154 
people were killed during the remaining months of the year (Fay, 1999:136). In the midst of the 
violence, calls for civil rights became louder and more unified. Even the more pragmatic, 
progressive of the Nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, the Social Democratic Labor Party 
(SDLP), called for Catholics to remove themselves from public life in protest of Internment. 
 Civil rights protesters began organizing a march in Derry to voice their opposition to 
Internment. The date was set for January 30th, 1972. By sunset on January 30th in Derry 
numerous civilians were injured, thirteen were dead and a fourteenth would die several months 
later, all killed by British Paratroopers. Much of Bloody Sunday’s history revolves around the 
events of the day and the subsequent sociopolitical implications of what many viewed as a state-
orchestrated massacre.  
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 Lee’s (1989) discussion of Bloody Sunday offers a somewhat slanted view of the events 
of the day. He discusses Bloody Sunday and the subsequent fallout of January 30th 1972 under 
the subheading “The Fall of Stormont.” Lee’s analysis places the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the British Army. Since the beginning of Operation Demetrius, all marches were 
banned in Northern Ireland. However, Lee highlights the impotency of this policy, stating that 
the civil rights march on January 30th was “yet another illegal march, like all marches since 9 
August” (p.440). Despite this, other civil rights marches had gone on without incident since 
August, “including five in January” (p.440). To Lee, the marching ban was all bark and no bite 
until Bloody Sunday. He makes few concessions in the defense of British soldiers, whom he 
believes acted entirely out of line in carrying out pointless arrests as the march was dispersing. 
Furthermore, he argues that neither the RUC nor the British army acted in accordance with this 
marching ban, failing to prevent it from happening in the first place. Sardonically mocking the 
British Paratroopers, Lee interrupts his history and injects a bit of literature by Nobel Laureate 
Seamus Heaney, “PARAS THIRTEEN, the wall said, BOGSIDE NIL” (Heaney, 1979:22 as 
cited in Lee, 1989:440). Perhaps in an effort to further acknowledge his own opinions in his 
writing, Lee frequently makes reference to both Nationalist and Loyalist belligerents scoring 
‘kills’ over the course of The Troubles. Juxtaposing Heaney’s sport allusion with a short critique 
of what he clearly feels to be a massacre committed by British soldiers, Lee explains, “…the 
professionals gave an amateur performance”(441). In giving this performance, the British Army 
made drastically worse the problem they were brought to Northern Ireland to mitigate. 
 Hennessey’s (1997) history of Northern Ireland echoes Lee  (1989) in that it frames 
Bloody Sunday as an aspect of The Troubles that led to the imposition of Direct Rule. Yet it 
differs in that it presents a much more neutral tone than Lee’s. As a traditionally articulated 
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history, Hennessey’s explanation offers little content that might sway readers. His summary of 
the events of Bloody Sunday is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. Hennessey states 
that “the shooting began…when part of the crowd tried to climb over a street barrier and were 
forced back by the British army using rubber bullets and spray from a water cannon,” but, he 
posits, “… it was never established who fired the first shots” (p.206). Other than referring to 
Bernadette Devlin expressing her outrage in the British House of Commons, Hennessey does 
little to underscore just how  “[t]he events of Bloody Sunday created a wave of anger throughout 
the Catholic community” (p.206). A paragraph later, Hennessey proceeds to the subsequent 
months after Bloody Sunday, arguing that they “were to be no less violent” (p.206). Then, he 
quickly moves on to the suspension of the Stormont Parliament for one year. Hennessey’s scant 
explanation of Bloody Sunday is somewhat explained by the fact that his book attempts to pack 
seventy-six years of history in Northern Ireland into approximately three-hundred pages, but 
nonetheless offers little in terms of analysis. 
 In This Troubled Land, Rucker (2002) uses a hybridized form of historical analysis, using 
first hand recollections, personal anecdotes and somewhat ambiguous back-stories to explain the 
impact of the events of Bloody Sunday. Rucker’s history diverges from Lee and Hennessey 
primarily in style of delivery, as well as overall aim. If placed on a spectrum, Widgery’s Inquiry 
would be on the Unionist end, Lee’s would be found towards the Nationalist terminal and 
Hennessey’s would be somewhere in the middle. Rucker’s, however, would be found across the 
spectrum, as he attempts to provide the rationale for all sides involved. Rucker also provides 
individual background stories to better illustrate the sentiments of Nationalists in the Bogside in 
the months following Internment and preceding Bloody Sunday. Rucker uses the same tactic to 
underscore the perspective of the Paratroopers, specifically an unnamed Para he calls Private 
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027, who discusses in detail pervasive attitudes among British troops deployed in Northern 
Ireland. As if he had collaborated with Lee, Private 027, frequently mentions an inexplicable 
desire to see combat and achieve “kills” during his time in Northern Ireland. Rucker makes no 
attempt to justify the actions of the 1st Battalion of British Paratroopers, but he provides 
extensive evidence that better explains their mindset heading into the civil rights march that 
became Bloody Sunday. 
 In reference to the controversial Widgery Report, Rucker argues that, at the time, “…the 
Widgery report was the final word on Bloody Sunday and hung over Catholics like a badge of 
ignominy” (Rucker, 2002:96). However, the inaccuracy of Widgery’s report is likely due to its 
hastened release, as well as the relatively contentious political environment it aimed to address. 
Rucker’s interview with Bloody Sunday eye-witness Leo Young tells us that “‘Widgery was an 
arrogant, cheeky bastard. He did not want to know nothing, he only wanted to get the whole 
thing through” (p.135). Expressing outrage at this, Young continues, “… I had to get my 
thoughts across [during the inquiry]… there was no way… they dismissed me as insignificant” 
(p. 135). As for Private 027, his opinion of the Widgery report was nearly as skeptical, though 
for his own sake he decided not to stir the pot. Rucker writes: 
 …Private 027 had planned to tell the truth, or as much as he could without implicating his 
colleagues. But when he described indiscriminate shooting towards the barricade, the 
lawyer stood up from his chair and looked down at the private with surprise. ‘We can’t 
have that, can we, Private? he asked. ‘That makes it sound as if shots were fired into the 
crowd’ (p. 135). 
As Private 027 illustrates, Rucker’s interest lies not in the primary actors involved in Bloody 
Sunday (like Young and Private 027), but instead in the sociopolitical constraints that generated 
  43 
an environment conducive to producing an atrocity like Bloody Sunday. Rucker’s history is 
valuable in that it attempts to provide perspective and context for events preceding, during, and 
after Bloody Sunday.  
Synthesis 
 While the deeply divided nature of Northern Ireland was made painfully obvious by the 
turmoil of 1969, Internment and Bloody Sunday exposed just how easily human malignancy can 
blow a conflict wide open. By examining primary accounts and historical depictions of 
Internment and Bloody Sunday through a lens of conflict theory, we can better understand how 
The Troubles further worsened due to a range of political, social, and environmental instigators. 
 As we have already established, Internment, supposedly implemented to combat rising 
paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, was ineffective at carrying out its original goals. 
Instead, Internment took an already uneasy population of Catholics, and put them further at odds 
with the three institutions that were theoretically supposed to protect them: the Government of 
Northern Ireland (Stormont), security forces (the RUC), the military (the British Army). The 
anger and tension generated by Internment contributed greatly to creating an environment of fear 
and uncertainty in Northern Ireland that transcended political allegiance. As a result, when civil 
rights protesters in Derry staged their march on January 30th, 1972, shots fired by British 
paratroopers broke the conflict wide open.  
 Bloody Sunday represents a catastrophic step backwards in the path towards conflict 
reconciliation. In terms of polarizing effects on the population of Northern Ireland, if the riots of 
1969 were a thunderstorm, Bloody Sunday was a category five hurricane. The shootings and 
ensuing political controversy radicalized throngs of previously apathetic Nationalists and 
Unionists. Appalled Nationalists, already having lost faith in Stormont and the RUC, and now 
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the supposedly neutral British Army, turned to paramilitary groups like the IRA and began to 
embrace them. Former Nationalist MP, Bernadette Devlin, who was heavily involved in both the 
1969 riots and Bloody Sunday, offered the following statement in retrospect, which perhaps best 
sums up the lasting impact of Bloody Sunday, 
…The key impact of Bloody Sunday was that a whole generation made a similar analysis 
and this fuelled some 25 years of violent political conflict, at least tolerated by the majority 
of the "minority population" and actively pursued by a significant but sustainable minority. 
It is responsibility for this legacy that sets Bloody Sunday apart from subsequent atrocities 
on all sides. (The Guardian, June 15th, 2010). 
4.2 Escalation and the Long War: “Negative, Destructive,” Conflict. (1972-1987) 
Introduction 
 The fallout of Bloody Sunday in 1972 was dramatic. In the months and years after, 
Northern Ireland’s Troubles escalated from small-scale political upheaval to an international, 
cross-border conflict that took countless lives. Section 4.2, “Escalation and the Long War: 
Negative, Destructive, Conflict,” is devoted to an analysis of the development of “negative 
destructive conflict” in Northern Ireland over a span of fifteen years. The Bergof Foundation’s 
definition of Conflict Transformation posits that the purpose of Conflict Transformation is to 
“transform negative, destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict” (“Bergof 
Foundation” on Conflict Transformation, October, 2011). Before analyzing how and why The 
Troubles were transformed into positive, constructive, conflict, it is necessary to understand the 
how and why that made them incredibly negative and destructive. This period of “negative, 
destructive conflict” during The Troubles is known as ‘Escalation.’ In this time, paramilitary 
membership and activity were at all-time highs, and so were sectarian killings. Additionally, I 
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will highlight the mechanics of negative, destructive, conflict by examining the following five 
key paramilitary attacks that occurred between 1972 and 1987: 
 
 4.2a. Bloody Friday (1972) 
 4.2b. Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (1974) 
 4.2c. Warrenpoint Ambush and Mountbatten Assassination (1979) 
 4.2d. Brighton Hotel Bombing (1984) 
 4.2e. Enniskillen Bombing (1987) 
 
But first, it is important to establish criteria for what “Negative, Destructive, Conflict” really is. 
According to Augsberger (1992), “a conflict is destructive—has destructive consequences—if 
the participants are dissatisfied with the outcomes and all feel they have lost as a result of the 
conflict” (Augsberger, 1992:47). Augsberger acknowledges that his assertion is essentially a 
value-laden judgment, but it can readily be applied to conflict. This is because conflicts, at their 
core, are value-laden interactions, with one party’s values conflicting with an opposition’s 
values. The righteousness of these values is unimportant, as evidenced by the atrocious actions of 
Loyalist and Nationalist paramilitaries during The Troubles.  
 Paramilitary organizations may have often felt satisfaction following a strategic victory 
such as a successful ambush or a massive bombing, their stated desires were rarely if ever were 
satisfied by concessions from the political realm. In other words, their violent actions rarely, if 
ever, contributed to the achievement of their political goals. If paramilitary organizations were 
ever truly satisfied with the results of their violent campaign, they would not have a reason to 
conflict, unless they were anarchists (though some might go so far as to argue this point). 
Expanding his analysis of destructive conflict, Augsberger (1992) argues, 
…[d]estructive conflict is also characterized by four tendencies. In this case, the individuals 
or groups tend to: (1) expand the number of issues, participants, negative attitudes, and 
self-justifications. (2) Emancipate the conflict from its initiating causes so it can continue 
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after these are irrelevant or forgotten; (3) escalate into strategies of power tactics of threat, 
coercion and deception; and (4) polarize into uniform opinions behind single-minded and 
militant leadership (p.47). 
During the protracted violence of the 1970s and 1980s, these four tendencies played out quite 
visibly in the form of paramilitary escalation. As a result, violence of The Troubles spilled over 
the border of Northern Ireland into the Republic of Ireland and England. 
4.2a. Bloody Friday (1972) 
 On July 21st 1972, twenty-two bombs rattled Belfast, killing eleven people and injuring 
130. The bombs were planted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or ‘Provos,’ as a part of 
their military action plan (now called the Long War) to rid Northern Ireland of British rule. With 
the PIRA growing at a staggering rate following the atrocities of Bloody Sunday several months 
earlier and their demands not being met by the British Government, the PIRA felt it was time to 
mount a massive offensive against what they perceived to be an oppressive and violent British 
presence in Northern Ireland. While the PIRA gave numerous warnings as to the locations of the 
bombs shortly beforehand, they also gave hoax warnings, which generated tremendous confusion 
among security personnel and civilians. Over the next hour and a half, bombs exploded 
throughout Belfast, and many began subscribing to the notion that PIRA had officially 
discredited itself as a viable political entity by saturating itself in a campaign of excessive 
political violence. In an effort to quash further similar attacks, the British Government 
implemented Operation Motorman, designed forcibly retake control of Nationalist paramilitary 
controlled no-go areas in predominantly Catholic areas of Belfast and Derry. Bloody Friday, 
much like Bloody Sunday, further drew in individuals to both sides of the conflict, and is 
consistent with Augsberger’s assertion that negative conflict “expand[s] the number of issues, 
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participants, negative attitudes, and self-justifications” (Augsberger, 1992:47) in a given setting 
of conflict. 
Primary 
Irish Times 
 The Irish Times published a series of stories in the days following the bombings, but 
perhaps the most valuable sources are the headlines from the day after Bloody Friday, July 22, 
1972. Choosing to focus on the aftermath of the bombings as opposed to the bombings 
themselves, the Irish Times led with “GUNBATTLES FOLLOW BOMBING WAVE. MORE 
TROOPS BROUGHT IN TO SEAL WHOLE AREAS OF BELFAST” (Irish Times, July 22, 
1972). The second-most prominent headline for the day described the bombings in detail 
however, reading in large print: “PROVISIONALS ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAY OF 
TERROR”(Irish Times, July 22, 1972). The vast majority of this article is devoted to painting an 
image of the day’s events. It includes a statement released by the PIRA, which reads: 
We accept full responsibility for all explosions in the Belfast area today. In accepting 
responsibility we point out that the following organizations were informed of bomb positions at 
least 30 minutes to one hour before each explosion—the Samaritans, the Public protection 
agency, the rumour service, and press. 
The Irish Times makes no qualms about expressing the vulgarity of the attack, citing 
“scenes of panic, horror, and confusion” and the presence of “unanimous condemnation” 
specifically criticizing the PIRA’s decision to release numerous hoax warnings, which 
severely undermined efforts of security personnel and the public to mitigate the looming 
damage. 
London Times 
  48 
 While the Irish Times chose to lead with a story about British crackdown in Northern 
Ireland following the Bloody Friday, the London Times bluntly led with “ELEVEN DIE, 130 
ARE INJURED AFTER BOMBS EXPLODE ALL OVER BELFAST” (London Times, July 22, 
1972). The details that surface in this article are much more unnerving than those in the Irish 
Times. The article lambasts the PIRA and then describes the bombings of the day as “their most 
savage and ruthless bombing attack in Belfast” with “pieces of flesh and broken bones, bearing 
no resemblance to the human body, [lying] on the road.” Echoing the Irish Times however, this 
story describes the general chaos that filled Belfast during and after the bombings. The concerns 
of Protestants are also voiced who claimed that if the British Army did not take action “…the 
majority community might take the law into their own hands.” Furthermore, the article forecasts 
a rapid military escalation “against the IRA inside Catholic housing estates.” 
Academic 
 The general attitude toward Bloody Friday in historical texts generally mirrors that of the 
newspapers in the Republic of Ireland and England on July 22, 1972. Lee, Taylor, and Hennessy 
all draw similar conclusions from the bombings of Bloody Friday in that they feel they were 
integral in further distancing Nationalists and Unionists from one another. First, that the 
warnings given by the PIRA were “hopelessly inadequate” (Taylor, 1998:150). Second, that the 
images displayed on television depicting the aftermath of the bombing were a testament to the 
horrific nature of these bombings (Both Hennessey, 1997:212 and Taylor, 1998:149 note 
television coverage). Lee returns to his sardonic use of ‘score’ once more, stating that the “PIRA 
scored eleven kills and wounded another 130, many maimed for life.” (Lee 1989, 442.) Several 
other historical texts offer virtually the same chronology and content of the events of Bloody 
Friday, offering little more than a paragraph on the subject before moving on to the next event. 
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The academic consensus on Bloody Friday was that it was simply another event in the somber 
historical timeline of The Troubles in Northern Ireland.  
Synthesis 
 It is my assertion that understanding Bloody Friday is integral to locating social, 
religious, and political attitudes in Northern Ireland, the greater United Kingdom, and the 
Republic of Ireland on the timeline of Conflict Transformation. Without question, both primary 
documents and academic discourse attempt to highlight the disturbing nature of the Bloody 
Friday bombings. However, the difference between leading headlines of the Irish Times and 
London Times is indicative of the way cultural and political biases framed violence during the 
early 1970s of The Troubles. The Irish Times’ decision to lead with the subsequent crackdown 
by the British Army following the Bloody Friday bombings is curious as neither headline 
directly involves violence in the Republic of Ireland. Whether intentional or not, the decision to 
display the violence that took place after the Bloody Friday Bombings more prominently than 
the incredibly violent bombings itself places symbolic importance on post-bombing violence. In 
doing so, this detracts from the illaudable actions of an unapologetic PIRA who had just blown 
11 individuals to bits in Belfast and places the emphasis on the reactionary violence of the 
British Army and RUC. 
 Furthermore, the actions of the PIRA on Bloody Friday are in line with Augsberger’s 
‘first tendency’ in negative conflict, which is to “expand the number of issues, participants, 
negative attitudes, and self-justifications [for conflict]” (Augsberger, 1992 p.47). As PIRA 
membership grew in Northern Ireland, violence increased. Short-lived cease-fires were broken 
repeatedly by the PIRA because they claimed the British Government refused to acknowledge 
the validity of their demands. The breakout of bombings in Belfast on July 21st, 1972 was not 
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simply another penny in the jar of paramilitary violence. Instead Bloody Friday marked a 
transition to escalation in Northern Ireland—a transition to negative, destructive, conflict. 
4.2b Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (1974) 
 May 17th 1974 marked another devastating escalation of the conflict in Northern Ireland, 
as violence spilled over the border into the town of Monaghan and the Irish capital, Dublin. The 
bombings occurred round 5:30 pm on a Friday—rush hour. In total, 33 people died and 
approximately 300 were injured. The fact that there were no warnings given before the blasts is 
likely a major contributing factor in the incredibly high casualty total. The Dublin and Monaghan 
bombings were a direct attempt by loyalist paramilitaries to escalate The Troubles. This is made 
evident by Loyalist paramilitaries who, according to UDA spokesperson Sammy Smyth, now felt 
they were at “war with the free state” (UDA Response to Dublin and Monaghan bombings, 
1974). By bombing civilian targets in the Republic of Ireland, it is clear that Loyalist 
paramilitaries were trying to  “…emancipate the conflict from its initiating causes so it can 
continue after these are irrelevant or forgotten” (Augsberger 1992 p. 47). 
Primary Sources 
Irish Times 
 The Irish Times unsurprisingly expressed disgust over the incidents, leading with the 
headline “28 KILLED, OVER 100 INJURED IN BOMB BLASTS IN DUBLIN, 
MONAGHAN” with a subscript reading “Many women, children among victims; nationwide 
alert on danger of further bombs” (Irish Times, May 18, 1974).The article also mentions that no 
warnings were given before the bombs exploded and then goes on to cite Irish Taoiseach Liam 
Cosgrave who issued a formal statement on the matter: 
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…what has happened today will help to underline the criminal folly and utter futility of 
violent action as a means for furthering political ends. It will also help to bring home to us 
here, in this part of our island, what the people of Northern Ireland have been suffering for 
five long years. Today’s evil deeds will only serve to strengthen the resolve of those, North 
and South, who have been working for peace.  
The article proceeds to acknowledge that all main paramilitary organizations have either denied 
responsibility for (UDA and UVF) or condemned (PIRA) the bombings.  
London Times 
 The London Times headline for May 18th was quite similar to that of the Irish Times, 
reading: “28 KILLED, HUNDREDS HURT BY EIRE CAR BOMBS: RUSH HOUR 
DEVASTATION IN CENTRAL DUBLIN” (London Times, May 18th, 1974). The article makes 
note of the fact that both the PIRA and UDA denied responsibility for the bombing. This article 
also focuses on the general confusion that plagued Dublin and Monaghan after the bombings, 
claiming, “people were running and screaming aimlessly.” The second-leading story discusses 
the political response by both Northern Irish officials as well as the Republic’s government. This 
article does, however, make mention of the PIRA’s insistence that the bombings were “an SAS-
type operation,” in other words, a product of British collusion. The London Times employs Chief 
Executive Faulkner’s response to the bombings, quoting “whatever the differences of opinion 
which may exist on other matters, I believe the responsible people in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic alike want to see this island rid forever of the evil forces which are guilty of such acts” 
(London Times, May 18th, 1974). 
Academic 
  52 
 The Dublin and Monaghan bombings are especially interesting in a historical context 
because they play a large role in the history both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In 
purely academic works like Hennessey and Lee, the Dublin and Monaghan bombings are framed 
under the fallout of the Ulster Worker’s council strike and the subsequent collapse of the 
Sunningdale agreement (this will be discussed in section 4.4). Lee and Hennessey present the 
attacks as a knee jerk reaction by loyalist paramilitaries to the impotent cross-border Council of 
Ireland (which gave the Republic say in matters such as cultural preservation, tourism and 
agriculture). Both Coogan (1987) and Taylor (1998) cast doubts as to any collusion by the 
British Government in either bombing, but Coogan goes as far as saying the Dublin and 
Monaghan Bombings were the “Republic’s Bloody Friday” (Coogan, 1987:26). This is true 
insofar as it raised paranoia and increased the vigilance of security forces on both sides of the 
border. 
Synthesis 
 The real impact of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings is open to interpretation, but for 
the purposes of this thesis, these bombings are best historically understood when contextualized 
in Augsberger’s four qualities of negative conflict. As I have outlined, Augsberger posits that 
actors in negative, destructive conflict seek to escalate the conflict to a point where its initiating 
causes become irrelevant, thus allowing it to continue indefinitely (Augsberger, 1992: 47). The 
Dublin and Monaghan bombings did exactly this. While many in the Republic of Ireland had 
opinions on the conflict in Northern Ireland, the majority did little to influence it one way or 
another. Newspapers in the Republic of Ireland and England recorded the terror of the days’ 
events, helping external observers generate their own political opinions as such. If the goal of 
Loyalist paramilitaries was to rid the North of Republican Governmental cooperation (the 
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Council of Ireland) as Lee (1989) and Hennessey (1997) suggest, logic dictates that they would 
not bomb its unaffiliated civilians in the Republic—a move that would seemingly draw the 
Republic of Ireland further into the conflict. A slough of bombings directed at non-military 
targets, later owned up to by Loyalist paramilitaries, is an example of negative conflict 
escalation. It attempted to expand the conflict to something it physically wasn’t—what UDA 
spokesperson Sammy Smyth called a “War with the Free State.” It again conjured up feelings of 
anti-British sentiment across the island of Ireland and further stoked the flames of the IRA’s 
Long War, escalating the conflict to new levels of violence. 
4.2c Warrenpoint Ambush and Mountbatten Assassination (1979) 
 August 27th 1979 was one of the most costly days for the British military in Northern 
Ireland but was simultaneously one of the most “successful” days for the PIRA in the history of 
The Troubles.  PIRA regiments carried out two successful attacks. The first was the assassination 
of Lord Mountbatten, former Admiral of the Fleet in the British Royal Navy, in Sligo, Republic 
of Ireland. The second was a PIRA ambush on British troops at Warrenpoint, which took the 
lives of 18 British soldiers. Viewed as two major victories for the PIRA and their Long War, 
these two events caused the British Government to seriously reconsider their intelligence strategy 
in regards to a PIRA that, to return to Augsberger, was now clearly making use of their dubious 
ability to use threat, coercion, and deception to inflict harm and thrive in an atypical war. 
Primary 
Irish Times 
 The day after the Warrenpoint and Mountbatten attacks, the Irish Times led with “BOMB 
ON BOAT KILLS LORD MOUNTBATTEN” (Irish Times, August 28, 1979). The article notes 
PIRA responsibility and underscores growing international demands for peace and an end to 
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violence in Northern Ireland. Irish Minister for Justice Mr. Gerry Collins voiced his concerns 
stating that the Government of the Republic of Ireland’s reaction is “one of revulsion and deep 
shock” and that “any changes which might be necessary to deal with terrorist would be 
considered by the government.” Furthermore, Collins expressed his “hope that this incident 
would have no impact on Anglo-Irish relations.” The second most prominent article on the front 
page of the Irish Times details the Warrenpoint Ambush. The PIRA’s claim of responsibility is 
again included, with a transcript of an official statement by PIRA leaders saying they “‘admit 
responsibility… for landmine explosions’ and would continue their campaign until there was ‘a 
declaration by Britain of intent to withdraw from the North’”(Irish Times, August 28, 1979). 
London Times 
 There was a suspension of operations for the London Times for nearly a year (December 
1, 1978 to November 12, 1979) due to a labor dispute. As a result, there was no newspaper 
published immediately following the PIRA attacks of August 27th, 1979. When the paper 
returned in mid-November of that same year, it published a News Review of the events that 
occurred during the work stoppage. The news review contained an article with titled 
“GROWING AUDACITY OF IRA ATTACKS BLIGHTS HOPE OF BRINGING ULSTER 
CLOSER TO PEACE” (London Times, November 14, 1979). Above the title is a smaller 
headliner that announces “TERRORISTS BECOMING MORE PROFESSIONAL AND LESS 
VULNERABLE.” The article describes the bombing assassination of Mountbatten in Sligo as 
well as the ambush bombing of British troops at Warrenpoint as “terrorist coups” which 
“precipitated a hurried review of … security policies and in particular [inter-governmental] 
cooperation in the area of border” (London Times, November 14, 1979). 
Academic 
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 Both the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the ambush killing of 18 British Soldiers 
at Warrenpoint are looked upon as major contributing factors to the growth and support of Sinn 
Fein. Furthermore, Lee argues that Mountbatten’s death and the Warrenpoint Ambush directly 
influenced perceptions of the PIRA (Lee 1989:455), giving them more credibility as a legitimate 
politically minded military entity amongst Nationalists. Coogan lends credence to the notion that 
the heavy military loss inflicted by the PIRA at Warrenpoint, was far more important to rallying 
Nationalist support than what was perceived by many as a merely symbolic assassination of Lord 
Mountbatten. But according to Alfred McClung-Lee’s Terrorism in Northern Ireland (1983), the 
celebrity status of Lord Mountbatten as well as the tactical superiority displayed by the IRA at 
Warrenpoint made August 27th simply an all-around major “victory” for the PIRA (p.188). PIRA 
leadership thought the attacks, especially Warrenpoint, would demoralize British troops. 
However, the effect the events of August 27th actually generated, however, was quite the 
opposite. Increased security and surveillance were added to an already massive laundry list of 
day-to-day conflict management policies in Northern Ireland and the Republic Ireland. 
Synthesis 
 The events of August 27th, 1979 had both symbolic and concrete political consequences. 
Mountbatten’s assassination and the Warrenpoint ambush highlighted that the British 
Government was dealing with a very real foe, not simply a disorganized paramilitary opponent. 
The decisive PIRA victory at Warrenpoint displays that they were well versed in combat 
operations and were not to be taken lightly. In essence Warrenpoint showed that the PIRA had 
adapted to the constraints of the given conflict, characterized by their inability to wage a full-
scale traditional military engagement, to create a viable, destructive action plan through the use 
of threat, coercion, and deception (Augsberger’s 3rd tendency of negative, destructive conflict). 
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This adaptation further involved both sides in the conflict, as intelligence and security in the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland had to be reexamined and fortified in order to 
counteract escalating paramilitary violence. 
4.2d Brighton Hotel Bombing (1984)   
 In an audacious attempt to assassinate Margaret Thatcher and her entire cabinet on 
October 12th, 1984, PIRA militants bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton, England where 
Thatcher and her cabinet were staying for the 1984 Conservative Party Conference. Neither 
Thatcher nor any member of her cabinet was harmed in the blast that killed five individuals and 
injured upwards of thirty. The PIRA claimed responsibility and expressed no remorse. The attack 
was representative of the ultimate struggle of Republican paramilitaries—a small, but powerful 
group (the PIRA) waging war against a seemingly insurmountable opponent (the “interfering” 
British Government).  This direct attack on the British Government by the PIRA exemplifies 
Augsberger’s fourth tendency, which argues that conflicting groups (in this case the PIRA) are 
“polarized into uniform opinions behind a single minded and militant leadership” (Augsberger 
1992, 47). 
Primary 
Irish Times 
 The Irish Times made it a point to convey the destruction that was caused by the previous 
days bombings, leading with: “Thatcher escapes death by minutes: FOUR KILLED AS IRA 
BOMB BRIGHTON HOTEL.” Mentioned is the fact that this was a no-warning blast that 
appeared to be an “IRA mass assassination attempt on the British cabinet [which] demolished 
part of the Grand Hotel.” The remorseless PIRA issued a statement that was run in the paper. It 
read: 
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The IRA claims responsibility for the detonation of 100lb of gelignite in Brighton against 
the British Cabinet and Tory Warmongers. Mrs. Thatcher will now realize that Britain 
cannot occupy our country and torture our prisoners and shoot our people on their own 
streets and get away with it. Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be 
lucky once—you will have to be lucky always. Give Ireland peace and there will be no 
war. 
The article describes a response by Thatcher in which she called the attack “inhuman,” a 
statement that echoed widespread international condemnation of PIRA actions. (Irish Times, 
October 13, 1984). 
London Times 
 The London Times went with a somewhat bolder headline, titled: “THATCHER DEFIES 
IRA BOMBERS.” Which describes how the British Prime Minister kept her cool and maintained 
firm opposition to the use of paramilitary violence as a means of achieving political gains within 
the United Kingdom. The article does however note that Thatcher was somewhat surprised that 
she was targeted by the PIRA, stating, “you read about these things happening, but you never 
believe it will happen to you” (London Times, October 13, 1984). 
Academic 
 The Brighton Bombing is similar to the Mountbatten Assassination and Warrenpoint 
Ambush as they were viewed as ‘spectacular’ acts of violence. Small-scale, local PIRA attacks 
were slowly being replaced by large scale ones in what seemed to be an attempt to generate 
attention and support for their cause. In fact, in an examination of several historical texts, the 
word ‘spectacular’ is used in most all descriptions of the Brighton Hotel Bombing, including 
Coogan (1987), Lee (1989), Hennessey (1997), and Fay (1999). Exemplifying the IRA’s struggle 
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to be perceived as a legitimate opponent, Fay (1999) makes the point that “the IRA was 
convinced that ‘spectaculars’ outside Northern Ireland, typified by the Brighton Bombing, an 
attempt to kill the entire British Cabinet, would be more productive than local violence” (p.154). 
Despite this, the PIRA made very few attempts to bolster their credibility to suppor their political 
wing, as the revolving door between PIRA hierarchy and Sinn Fein remained painfully obvious. 
Hennessey (1997) supports this conclusion arguing, that the “Brighton Bombing reiterated that, 
despite the recent electoral success of the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, the armed campaign 
still held priority” (p.263).  
Synthesis 
 Augsberger’s fourth tendency, when applied to the Brighton Bombing, explains why the 
conflict began to enter a period of stalemate. While paramilitary violence continued on either 
side, the frequency and intensity at which it occurred began to stabilize (see Brahm’s chart at the 
beginning of chapter 4). While the PIRA was united behind “single-minded and militant 
leadership” (Augsberger 1992, p.47), so was the opposition. Thatcher’s militant opposition to 
terrorist activity (as made famous by her assertion that there is no such thing as political 
violence), made it clear that the single-minded opposition of the PIRA and their Long War would 
accomplish little in cracking Unionist hegemony, pushing forward the idea that an armed 
campaign was a no-win strategy. As the 1980s pressed on, it became clear that the PIRA’s 
violent tactics appealed to radical Nationalists, not a more moderate Nationalist crowd that 
subscribed to a more pragmatic, water-on-stone school of political change. And while the armed 
campaign continued for some years on, it began to dissipate after the Enniskillen Bombing in 
1987. 
4.2e The Enniskillen Bombing (1987) 
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 As the tumult of the 1980s wore on, attitudes toward paramilitary violence became 
increasingly negative. People were growing tired of hearing about the same violence on the news 
day in, day out, with little or no progress to discuss in the political arena. While there is no set 
point as to when The Troubles began to turn in the favor of peaceful progress, a bombing during 
a November 8th, 1987 Remembrance Day parade in Enniskillen deeply shook Northern Ireland. 
In total, twelve individuals were killed. Among the initial dead was one RUC officer and ten 
civilians. A final casualty occurred thirteen years later in 2000, when a victim passed away after 
being in a coma since the bombing. The fact that it was mostly civilian deaths and injuries was 
devastating for individuals on both sides of the conflict. As a result, the PIRA in Fermanagh was 
dismantled and PIRA higher-ups found themselves reconsidering their armed campaign. While 
numerous bombings occurred the following decade, the late 1980s and 1990s were 
predominantly characterized by a major campaign for peace. 
Primary 
Irish Times 
 The Enniskillen Bombing made front-page news in the Irish Times with the headline 
reading: “11 CIVILIANS KILLED IN ENNISKILLEN WAR MEMORIAL BOMBING.” The 
article asserts, “the bomb, which caused carnage among a crowd assembling for a Remembrance 
Day ceremony in Enniskillen, was intended to kill civilians, the RUC Chief Constable, Sir John 
Hermon, said last night.” Among the injured were children as young as two years old, and one 
child lost both parents in the blast. The article continues to highlight the damaging effects this 
bombing was bound to cause, quoting Northern Ireland Secretary Mr. Tom King, who called the 
bombing “a scar on the face of the whole island of Ireland.” Mr King continues, “…it is difficult 
to conceive a more callous and appalling outrage than has been committed here today… In any 
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civilized society there is no place for people who can commit outrages of this kind” and that the 
perpetrators had a “depraved mentality.” (Irish Times, November 9th, 1987) 
London Times 
 The London Times highlights that the Enniskillen Bombing was a major blunder on the 
part of the PIRA. The headline read “11 DIE IN POPPY DAY MASSACRE: 
CONDEMNATION FOR IRA BOMB AT ULSTER WAR MEMORIAL.” As it had in the past, 
the London Times highlighted that the bomb exploded without warning, but this time it went 
further, stating “the outrage was immediately condemned by leaders in Britain, the Irish 
Republic, and around the world as the most disgusting ever perpetrated by the IRA.” This article 
also offers substantial clues as to how the tide was turning against the PIRA in The Troubles, 
explaining: 
Yesterday's explosion was clearly a retaliation by the Provisional IRA, which has suffered 
a series of setbacks to its terrorist campaign this year. The most notable reversal came in 
April when eight of its members were killed in a shoot-out with security forces at 
Loughgall, Co Armagh. More recently one of the top IRA bomb makers, Gerald McNamee, 
was convicted at the Central Court and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. 
(The London Times, November 9th, 1987) 
Academic 
 The abhorrence expressed in both Times stories is reflected in historical texts. Both 
Hennessey (1997) and Fay (1999) point to the Enniskillen Bombing as a turning point for 
Republican paramilitaries as a whole. Fay (1999) posits that the IRA was shaken to its very core 
in the aftermath of the bombing as evidenced by their “express[ing] deep regret for the bomb.” 
(p.154). As the bombing occurred on Remembrance Day, a day to remember fallen soldiers in 
the British military (independent of religion), many felt this bomb was a grotesque 
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miscalculation by an already suffering PIRA. Further, criticisms from the international 
community “gave the Republicans cause for serious reconsideration of IRA strategy”(p.154). 
Hennessey (1997) outlines how a general trend of strategy reassessment by the Republican camp 
was further bolstered by solidarity talks between the moderate SDLP and Left Wing Sinn Fein in 
1988.  
Synthesis 
 In the aftermath of Bloody Friday, the Dublin and Monoghan Bombings, the Mountbatten 
assassination, the Warrenpoint Ambush, and the Brighton Hotel Bombing, neither Loyalist nor 
Nationalist paramilitaries admitted any wrongdoings, let alone apologized. Enniskillen was 
different in that the subsequent backlash was not characterized by a noticeable escalation in the 
conflict. It is at this point that we see the negative conflict phase of The Troubles begin to 
collapse on itself. The conflict became so negative that many of the very actors carrying out the 
atrocities began to question the morality of their campaign.  
Conclusion 
 The violence that plagued Ireland and Great Britain during the escalation period of The 
Troubles is an example of negative, destructive conflict. While an isolated analysis of each of the 
events of the escalation period (1972-1987) would yield a confusing array of violence, anarchy, 
and sociopolitical turmoil, a sequential analysis framed by Augsberger’s four tendencies of 
negative conflict, culminates in the validation of Augsberger’s assertion that conflict is negative 
and destructive when “participants are dissatisfied with the outcomes and all feel they have lost 
as a result of the conflict” (Augsberger 1992, 47). In other words, Augsberger’s theory that 
negative conflict produces an a feeling of loss on both sides would be disproved by a singular 
examination of an event like the Warrenpoint Ambush—where the PIRA emerged jubilant and 
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the British army questioning itself. However, when a one-sided event such as the Warrenpoint 
Ambush is contextualized within the bigger picture— as a part of a series of events that 
ultimately led to the PIRA reassessing itself internally— we see that the escalation period (1972-
1987) is actually a process of negative, destructive conflict. It is a process within a bigger 
process of Conflict Transformation.  
4.3 The 1981 Hunger Strikes: Failure to Recognize Oppositional Legitimacy 
 The most troublesome years of the conflict in Northern Ireland were undoubtedly the 
1970s and 1980s. As we have seen, these years were marred by countless acts of senseless 
violence directed at military targets, political figures, and civilians. But among the most widely 
scrutinized and preventable deaths of The Troubles are the deaths of ten Republican Paramilitary 
hunger strikers, who starved themselves to death while serving jail time in 1981 in an attempt to 
put pressure on the British Government to improve conditions in the prisons for paramilitary, or 
as they saw themselves, political, prisoners. The Hunger Strikes of 1981 occurred following a 
series of failed protests known the Dirty Protest and Blanket Protest as well as the first hunger 
strikes in 1980. Throughout the duration of the 1981 Republican Hunger Strikes, the British 
Government refused to reinstate political status for all paramilitary prisoners (although there 
were special exemptions). When demands were softened by Republicans and reduced to five 
basic privileges, the British Government stood pat, continually denying paramilitary prisoners 
the right to: 
1. Not wear a prison uniform; 
2. Not do prison work; 
3. Free association with other prisoners; 
4. Increased mail and external interaction; 
5. Restoration of remission lost through protest. 
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 Patrick Coy argues that empowerment and recognition are at the heart of transformative 
mediation (Coy, 2009:68) but as the conflict in Northern Ireland plunged into its darkest period 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, it was clear that neither Nationalist nor Unionist was making 
concrete steps in moving towards developing mutual understanding and recognition. For every 
step toward conflict resolution taken during the 1970s and 1980s it seemed that paramilitary 
violence forced Northern Ireland and its people to take two backward. The Hunger Strikes of 
1981 represented extremes of both Nationalist and Unionist ideology, indicative of the 
fundamental disconnect present in Northern Ireland during the height of The Troubles. 
 When framed by Coy’s theory on transformative mediation, the Republican Hunger 
Strikes of 1981 illustrate just how divided a society Northern Ireland was. As paramilitary 
violence continually escalated during the early 1980s the Hunger Strikes of 1981 made it clear 
that Republican paramilitaries and the British Government were seeing a completely different 
conflict. Over a period of seven months, ten Republican prisoners took their own lives by 
refusing food in protest of the British Government’s continued refusal to recognize the political 
nature of their cause. When the strike ended in October 1981 there were only informal 
indications that any of the five demands would be met. There would be no reinstatement of 
political status. There would be no empowerment and there would be no recognition.  
Primary 
Irish Times 
 The following five Irish Times articles describe the sequence of events that transpired 
between March and October during the 1981 Republican Hunger Strikes. As continued demands 
for acknowledgement of political status for paramilitary prisoners fell on deaf ears, Republican 
prisoners turned once more to hunger striking in March of 1981. The outset of the strike is noted 
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by the Irish Times: “DIRTY PROTEST ENDED BY 400 REPUBLICAN PRISONERS” (Irish 
Times, March 3, 1981). The article quotes that the strike is, “a move which, it seems certain, will 
increase the pressure on the Provisional hunger striker, Bobby Sands, to carry his fast through 
death if necessary. The article continues that Sands “must now feel that not just the Provisionals 
outside the prison but also his colleagues inside are now entirely dependent on him to win 
concessions from the British Government.” As the British Government refused to acknowledge 
Sands and his fellow hunger strikers, Bobby Sands starved to death on May 5th, 1981, and the 
Irish Times led with: “SANDS DIES ON 66TH DAY.” The front-page article mourns “Mr. 
Bobby Sands, the 27 year old Republican Hunger Striker and Westminster MP, [who] died in the 
hospital wing of the Maze Prison, Long Kesh, early this morning.”  
 The strike carried on throughout the summer and on August 25th, the Irish Times again 
led with a hunger strike article: “SIXTH IRA PRISONER JOINS HUNGER STRIKE.” This 
article highlights that ten hunger strikers have died since April and also cites Republican 
prisoners who issued a statement reading, “with ten hunger strikers dead and even more innocent 
civilians we ask when is the Dublin Government, the SDLP and the Church going to end their 
respective postures of inactivity and act vigorously and decisively to save any further loss of 
life?” An unflinching political response by the British ultimately led to the end of the protest in 
early October, as it was clear to Republican prisoners that they would have to approach their 
demands differently. The Irish Times on October 5th, 1981 released a statement authored by 
Republican prisoners in the H Blocks, titled “WHY THE PRISONERS ENDED THEIR 
PROTEST.” The statement cites British reneging on concessions to prisoners following first 
Hunger Strike (1980) as the reason for second hunger strike and also claims that Bobby Sands 
was “murdered by British Callousness and vindictiveness.” It further criticizes the “Dublin Bloc 
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of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and Labour [as] accessories to legalized murder of 10 committed 
Irishmen who died heroically in the long tradition of Republican resistance to British 
Occupation, oppression and injustice in Ireland.” Furthermore, the statement questions the 
hypocrisy of the Republic of Ireland’s official stance toward the Hunger Strikers, as jails in the 
Republic of Ireland maintained a policy consistent with their demands. The prisoners concluded 
by reaffirming their “commitment to the achievement of the five demands by whatever means… 
necessary and expedient, rul[ing] nothing out.”  
 Following the cessation of the strikes, the British Government announced that small 
changes were forthcoming in the prison system, and the Irish Times led with: “PRISON 
CHANGES TO BE KNOWN SHORTLY” on October 6, 1981. Still the article notes that “any 
changes in the prison regime may fall far short of the demands made by the protesting prisoners, 
and Northern Ireland office sources were indicating that changes would be of a minor nature 
rather than a radical switch in prison policy.” Furthermore, indicating the blanket-nature of any 
concessions to prisoners in Northern Ireland, the article reads “any changes announced will 
automatically apply to all prisoners in Northern Ireland prisons, so that there can be no 
suggestion that the Republican prisoners in the Maze achieved the concessions for themselves 
through their protest.” Still, Unionist organizations felt their government had let them down, 
noted by the DUP who “sent a telegram to Mrs. Thatcher saying that concessions to the 
Republican prisoners would sully the memory of the 64 people killed since the hunger strike in 
March, and would condemn more people to death by giving the PIRA a reason to carry on.” 
London Times 
 The London Times followed the course of the 1981 Hunger Strikes closely, publishing 
updates on the prisoners and on the governments monitoring them. The article that marks the 
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beginning of the 1981 strike highlights the ideological gap between Maze prisoners and the 
British Government. The March 2nd, 1981 headline for the London Times reads: “IRA 
PRISONERS’ LEADER BEGINS HUNGER STRIKE” and notes that “the prisoners contend 
that the [British] government has failed to carry out verbal promises given at the time [following 
the 1980 hunger strike] about living conditions of terrorist inmates.” It is interesting to note here 
the use of the word ‘terrorist’ instead of ‘paramilitary,’ ‘republican,’ or even ‘Provisional’ (in 
reference to the PIRA). Upon Bobby Sands’ death on May 5th, the Times read: “SANDS DIES 
IN MAZE PRISON AFTER 66 DAYS.” This article, while titled nearly identically to the Irish 
Times story, portrays Sands’ death as “needless and pointless,” noting, “too many have died by 
violence in Northern Ireland.” The article notes that Sands even ignored his mother, who 
eventually stopped appealing to him to end his hunger strike. 
  A little less than a month later, the London Times ran an editorial piece begging the 
question “SHOULD THE TERRORISTS BE GIVEN AIRTIME?” (June 4th, 1981). As the 
hunger strikes were an international media sensation that negatively portrayed the British 
Government, the article highlights the danger of potentially putting wind in the sails of the IRA 
by publicizing them (either negatively or positively). The editorial asserts that the IRA is not 
only seeking to undermine [British] society, but they are pursuing their ends by violence…” and 
furthermore, “they are seeking to either frighten or exasperate the British people into pulling out 
of Northern Ireland.” Additionally, the article quotes Prime Minister Thatcher, who reiterates 
media “can give convicted criminals on hunger strike the myth of martyrdom they crave, but… 
nothing would be more damaging than misinformation and lack of balance.” 
 In the June 8th article “FIFTH MAN JOINS HUNGER STRIKE AT THE MAZE” the 
London Times makes note of the IRA’s desire to keep at least one prisoner near death at all times 
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to apply pressure to the British Government, stating “the period of respite since the last hunger 
striker death is seen as a tactical error; the next death is not likely until late this month.” Toward 
the end of the strike, an October 3rd article titled “END OF MAZE HUNGER STRIKE IN 
SIGHT” highlights how the combination of family intervention and lack of any real pressure on 
the British Government to resolve the strike are very likely to bring an end to the strike. The 
Strike finally ended on October 3rd, 1981, and an article two days later titled “FOUR HUNDRED 
STAY ON BLANKET PROTEST” summarized the events of the strike. It read: “…in the 216 
days since Bobby Sands started the hunger strike, the two communities in Northern Ireland have 
become more polarized than ever.” As a result of this, there was a marked increase in casualties 
on either side of the conflict. The hunger strikes “whipped up support among people who had 
grown tired of the IRA… recruits flocked to join.”  And while the article notes that Sands’ 
“death brought demonstrations to the streets of New York, Paris and Rome” the failure of the 
hunger strikes to achieve the stated demands of Republican prisoners “usefully deflates the myth 
of invincibility of the IRA.” 
Academic 
 The Republican Hunger Strikes at Maze Prison in 1981 made apparent, through their 
protracted run, the British Government’s unwillingness to recognize political legitimacy claimed 
by Republican prisoners during The Troubles. Much like Bloody Sunday a decade earlier, the 
hunger strikes of 1981 revived the Republican movement’s political fortunes by inflicting severe 
emotional trauma on the Catholic-Nationalist community in Northern Ireland (Hennessey 
1997:260). Bell’s 1993 work, The Irish Troubles posits that the 1981 Hunger Strikes, like 
Bloody Sunday, once again involved a previously apathetic population in a conflict that had 
violently escalated during the 1970s. Once again a “nation’s history of denial and suffering 
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because they were Catholic and Irish was recalled and refashioned” (Bell, 1993:609). Also 
contributing to this escalation of anger was Prime Minister Thatcher’s staunch refusal to consider 
the idea that ‘Republican’ prisoners were anything but common criminals. Hennessey (1997) 
makes note of Thatcher’s statement that the British Government is “not prepared to consider 
special category status for certain groups of people serving sentences for crime. Crime is crime is 
crime, it is not political” (p.261).  Also making mention of Thatcher’s perceived callousness in 
managing the hunger strikes is Fay (2009), positing that Thatcher’s stance was integral in further 
escalating animosity on the Republican side (p.62). While Sands and his compatriots saw 
themselves as political prisoners, Thatcher reiterated (upon Sands’ death) that “Mr. Sands was a 
convicted criminal, he took his own life… a choice his organization did not allow many of its 
own victims” (Hennessey 1997:261). J.J. Lee (1989) feels that the British Government’s 
“handling of the whole H Block situation was inept to the point of criminality. It threatened to 
endanger the political stability of not only Northern Ireland, but the Republic” (p.154) as well—
consequently risking a dramatic expansion of the conflict.  
Synthesis 
 The discord between Republican prisoners and the British Government represents the 
very core of The Troubles. On one side were the Republican Hunger Strikers, imprisoned 
individuals who didn’t believe that they were political prisoners, they knew they were political 
prisoners. On the other side was the British Government, who didn’t just believe Republican 
prisoners were criminals; they knew Republican prisoners were criminals (echoed quite clearly 
by Prime Minister Thatcher). If there is one thing we can take away from the hunger strikes, 
more clearly than any other event during The Troubles, it is that both Republican paramilitaries 
and the British Government viewed the relationship they had with each other through a 
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completely different lens. Bell (1993) supports this, arguing that the prisoners “… in Maze or the 
Kesh, whether criminals or patriots did not matter as long as no one made the other acquiesce in 
the opposing reality” (p.627). To both sides of the conflict, the Republican Hunger Strikes of 
1981 were about refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the opponent. Ten Republican 
Prisoners did so by starving themselves to death while the British Government did so by failing 
to recognize prisoners’ demands, thereby letting them starve to death.  
 The Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981 embody the antithesis of Coy’s (2009) theory on 
transformative conflict mediation. The lack of recognition of legitimacy by either side is integral 
to understanding why violent conflict continued throughout the duration of The Troubles. As the 
participants on both sides of the conflict were far from recognizing the legitimacy of the other, 
they were just as far from moving toward transformative conflict mediation. During and 
following the hunger strikes, the conflict in Northern Ireland was seen essentially as a violent 
clash of cultural and political ideologies, where two sides refused to mutually acknowledge the 
others’ narrative. 
Conclusion 
 It might seem to be an anachronistic error to place the Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981 
after the end of a discussion about escalation (which I suggest ends in 1987—six years after the 
strikes ended), but it is with good reason. The Hunger Strikes of 1981 undoubtedly were an 
integral part of the escalation of The Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s, but they have a more 
significant contribution to make to the overall understanding of The Troubles than violent events 
like Bloody Friday and the Brighton Hotel Bombing (among others). The Republican Hunger 
Strikes were not an example of paramilitaries attacking political, military, and civilian targets. 
They were an embodiment of the ideology that drove individuals to commit these acts of 
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violence. The fact that ten individuals were willing to sacrifice their own lives in hopes of 
providing legitimacy to their cause shows that The Troubles were not simply about the 
perpetuation of violence and anarchy. The fact that the British Government refused to grant 
political status to these protesters despite worldwide attention for the strikers, shows how firmly 
they believed these individuals were criminals. The Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981 show 
just how far the Northern Ireland still had to go in pursuit of peace.  
4.4 Building Peace: Conflict Transformation and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreements. 
 I have outlined some of the more acrimonious aspects of The Troubles of Northern 
Ireland in previous sections. This section is devoted to an exploration of the evolution of positive 
conflict, and peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Between 1973 and 1998, four unique peace 
agreements and declarations illustrate how a society torn apart by paramilitary violence, 
ideological differences, and fear, attempted to reconcile the wrongdoings of the past in an 
attempt to create and sustain peace. The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was the first such 
attempt at peace, lasting less than a year only to be dismantled by Unionist opposition. The 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 marked the second significant attempt by both British and Irish 
camps at forging peace during The Troubles. The ideologies pushed forward in this agreement 
set the table for the Downing Street Declaration of 1993, which laid the framework for the 
groundbreaking peace deal known as the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday 
Agreement). With each subsequent agreement, each side conceded more to the other, 
representing a mutual commitment to transforming “negative destructive conflict into positive 
conflict [by dealing with] structural, behavioral, and attitudinal aspects of conflict” (Berghof 
Foundation’s definition of Conflict Transformation). The peaceful progress signified by these 
four agreements, when framed by the incredibly violent, negative events of The Troubles 
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discussed in sections 4.1 through 4.3, articulates the overall importance of Conflict 
Transformation (as defined by the Berghof foundation) in engineering sustainable conflict 
resolution.  
4.4a The Sunningdale Agreement (1973): A Motion Towards Peace 
 The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was an early attempt to establish a powersharing 
Northern Ireland executive. As discussed earlier, the years prior to 1973 were among the most 
tumultuous ones of The Troubles. Internment, 1969 Riots, and Bloody Sunday were major 
contraindications against the legitimacy of the existing sociopolitical environment in Northern 
Ireland in the late 1960s and early 1970s. When the Sunningdale Agreement was approved, it 
proposed numerous solutions to problems plaguing Northern Ireland. Among them was a 
Council of Ireland, composed of ministers from the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
whose primary function was to cooperate on matters of cultural and economic importance. Other 
stipulations highlighted the importance of cross-community support of the police force and a 
desire to create a cross-border jurisdiction for an all-Ireland court. Though the Sunningdale 
Agreement was eventually rendered ineffective by widespread opposition (though primarily 
Unionist), it sought to address root causes of The Troubles. Sunningdale created a Council of 
Ireland and pushed for a reexamination of the RUC, thereby marking the first step in a lengthy 
and uncertain journey towards peace. 
Primary 
Summary of the Text of the Agreement (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk) 
 The Sunningdale Agreement is divided into twenty paragraphs detailing the aspirations of 
both the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister both individually and as a whole. Paragraph 
three articulates, “the people of the Republic, together with a minority in Northern Ireland as 
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represented by the SDLP delegation, continue to uphold the aspiration toward a United Ireland.” 
However, it also recognizes that “the only unity they [want] to see [is] a unity established by 
consent.” Placing faith in the prospective success of the agreement, the British Government 
subscribed to the idea that an overhaul of security policy in Northern Ireland could be addressed 
“as soon as the security problems were resolved and the new institutions [set forth by the 
agreement] were seen to be working effectively, they would wish to discuss… normal policing 
and how this might be achieved.” The agreement also sets forth ground rules for the return of 
executive powers to Stormont. 
Irish Times 
 The Irish Times ran a story following the approval of the Sunningdale Agreement with 
the December 10th, 1973 headline: “COUNCIL OF IRELAND IS AGREED: DUBLIN 
ACKNOWLEDGES THE STATUS OF THE NORTH UNTIL MAJORITY EXPRESSES 
DESIRE FOR CHANGE.” The article makes note that the Irish Government recognizes that it is 
up to the people of Northern Ireland to decide on any change to their constitutional status. Also 
discussed is the importance of fair policing, and that prospects of an all-Ireland court are 
incredibly unlikely due to conflicts over international jurisdiction. 
London Times 
 Across the Irish Sea in Britain, the London Times led with “AGREEMENT ON A 
COUNCIL OF IRELAND, FOUR DAY TALKS END IN DEAL ON POLICE, INTERNEES” 
(December 10, 1973). The article suggests that the Sunningdale Agreement was designed to 
“change relations substantially between Belfast and Dublin.” Making note of the statement 
released by Brian Faulker, then Chief Executive of Northern Ireland, the article quotes “we now 
have a very considerable achievement… which can lead to greater cooperation between North 
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and South.” Cautious optimism is expressed by The Times, but it also highlights opposition from 
both sides of the political spectrum, especially the Unionist camp. 
Academic 
 The Unionist outrage noted by the London Times the day after the passage of the 
Sunningdale Agreement snowballed in the following months, ultimately leading to the Ulster 
Worker’s Council (UWC) Strike and the eventual collapse of the powersharing executive in 
Northern Ireland. Unionists opposed the agreement primarily on the grounds that it was 
predicated on ‘interference’ by a foreign government (the Republic of Ireland) on the internal 
affairs of Northern Ireland. This opposition was made blatantly obvious by the subsequent UWC 
strike (Porter, 1993:46-47) and the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (section 4.2b). Fay (1999) 
agrees, arguing that the UWC strike rendered the powersharing executive useless (p.64). Lee 
(1989) expresses a similar belief, casting doubts on the strength of the executive, stating that it 
was “brutally clear that the executive had no mandate” (p.444). Furthermore, the Council of 
Ireland began to be perceived as largely symbolic and parties in British and Irish camps began to 
stop supporting it. Sunningdale was, according to Lee (1989) “dismantled out of mistrust and 
fear of the opposition” and “a lost opportunity for a new start” (444-445).  
Synthesis 
 While Lee (1989) feels Sunningdale was a lost opportunity for a new start, it was more 
than just that. Sunningdale is the first semblance we see of Conflict Transformation during The 
Troubles. Implemented as The Troubles were ‘leaving the gate’ so to speak, Sunningdale was 
dismantled because its goals did not match those of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. 
While British and Irish politicians may have outwardly stated that they were seeking a peaceful 
solution to the violence in Northern Ireland, the sociopolitical environment in which it was 
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implemented in was hardly ready for reconciliation. On Brahm’s curve of conflict intensity, 
Sunningdale is located right after “Conflict Emergence” (section 4.1) and during “Conflict 
Escalation” (section 4.2). Furthermore, doubts exist as to whether Faulkner and Cosgrave 
actually felt as if they were conceding anything to the opposition. Faulkner Felt that Sunningdale 
diminished the Republic’s territorial claim to Northern Ireland, while Taoiseach Cosgrave felt he 
had ceded nothing of the sort to Faulkner. Sunningdale failed not only because it lacked 
sustained support from moderate platforms, but also hard line Nationalists and Unionists. 
Furthermore, it was born in an era of ‘deeply dividing’ events in the Northern Irish community, 
such as Bloody Sunday, Bloody Friday, and the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. Still, what is 
often forgotten is the importance of Sunningdale, despite its rapid collapse, as the first attempt to 
address root causes of The Troubles through peaceful political means. In doing so, it became the 
symbolic first step toward Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland. 
4.4b The Anglo Irish Agreement (1985): Legitimacy of the ‘Other’ Grows 
 The Anglo-Irish Agreement was a 1985 peace agreement between the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland, which, like Sunningdale, stipulated that the Government of the 
Republic of Ireland be given an advisory role in the administration of the Government of 
Northern Ireland. The document was somewhat ambiguously worded to provide a platform for 
open dialogue between the British and Irish Government. Despite the agreement’s failure to 
garner the support across the spread of the Unionist camp and inability to bring an immediate 
end to political violence in Northern Ireland, the Anglo-Irish Agreement represents yet another 
step forward in the process of Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland by virtue of the fact 
that it was engineered to set a precedent of sustained engagement pursuing peace. 
Primary 
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Summary of the Text of the Agreement (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk) 
 The Anglo-Irish agreement set forth provisions quite similar to Sunningdale, but they 
were more loosely worded so as to promote constructive dialogue. Additionally, the tone of the 
agreement is more expressive of a desire to continue the peace process, suggesting that the 
architects of the agreement recognized that conclusive, direct wording would likely dismantle the 
peace process as it did in the wake of the Sunningdale Agreement. The document recognizes “the 
need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions 
that exist in Ireland.” It also reaffirms both Britain and Ireland’s “total rejection of any attempt to 
promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence” and an unending commitment 
to “work together to ensure that those who adopt or support such methods do not succeed.” The 
document also expresses the importance of genuine recognition and acceptance of the “rights… 
and identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland.” In a nod to a historical tradition of 
Nationalist abstention (a trend that was just beginning to disappear in the 1980s), the agreement 
conveyed a desire “for two communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of 
government—living in peace.” In addition to the calculated wording of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, the actual content of the agreement provides a framework for the development of a 
cross-community cohesion. It sets forth guidelines for the new Intergovernmental Council to be 
set up between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, but also recognizes that this 
Council will have no operational responsibilities in the internal bureaus of Northern Ireland’s 
government. The document also stresses the importance of a review of all aspects of life in 
Northern Ireland, especially in the realm of equal opportunity employment and cross-community 
recognition of police authority in Northern Ireland.  
Irish Times 
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 On November 16th, 1985, the Irish Times headline highlighted passage of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, reading: “ROLE IN NORTH FOR REPUBLIC AGREED: INTERNATIONAL 
SUPPORT AND PLEDGE FOR US AID.” The Times notes that the new peace agreement is 
much like Sunningdale, but “without its provision for a devolved power-sharing administration.” 
Still, the Times makes mention of the fact that the lack of a new devolved power-sharing 
executive is actually compensated for by “other mandates of the agreement regarding fair 
governance.” The article reminds readers of the significance of the new peace agreement, 
quoting Taoiseach Fitzgerald, “nationalists [can] now raise their heads knowing their position is, 
and is seen to be on an equal footing with that of members of the Unionist community.” Still, the 
article notes, numerous parties including the UUP, Sinn Fein, and Fianna Fail did not support the 
agreement.  
London Times 
 The cautious optimism expressed by the Irish Times is not matched by the London 
Times. The headline for November 16th, 1985 read “THATCHER AIMS FOR ULSTER PEACE 
IN HISTORIC DEAL.” A sub-headline follows “MINISTER QUITS IN PROTEST.” Much like 
Sunningdale, the Times notes that protest is widespread in Northern Ireland over the involvement 
of a foreign power, which was the impetus for the resignation of Mr. Ian Gow, Minister of the 
State at the Treasury. The article continues, “Unionist leaders have withdrawn all cooperation 
with ministers and are to boycott official bodies.” In an attempt to further clarify the issue of the 
Intergovernmental Council of Ireland, the article makes note that security matters in Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain will never be devolved. 
Academic 
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 There is a general consensus in academic literature is that the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
1985 failed to directly achieve its stated goal of achieving peace in Northern Ireland. However, 
the overall impression of the agreement is that it was merely a stepping-stone in the path to 
peace. Lee (1989) expressed doubt about the agreement (keep in mind he was writing just a few 
years after the agreement), arguing that the Intergovernmental Council “fell far short of forum 
aspirations, but nevertheless gave the Republic a voice in Northern Ireland affairs” (p.456). 
Writing several years later, Hennessey (1997) highlights that the Anglo-Irish Agreement came 
about as a result of increasing legitimacy of the other, arguing that in the early-to-mid 1980s, 
“the British Government… was confronted with the problem of … increasing electoral support 
for Sinn Fein” (p.270). It is important to remember the widespread impact that the Republican 
Hunger Strikes (section 4.3) had on drawing worldwide attention to the legitimacy of the 
Nationalist cause. Even Thatcher herself acknowledged that at the time, “the present dialogue 
with the Irish Government represented the best hope of improving co-operation,… security,… 
peace and stability in Northern Ireland (Hennessey 1997, p.272). While the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was far from a perfect peace agreement, Porter (2003) argues that it had far more 
staying power than Sunningdale, as its stipulations remained in place until they were replaced by 
those set forth by the Belfast Agreement in 1998.  
Synthesis 
 The Anglo-Irish Agreement is notable in an analysis of Conflict Transformation 
primarily because its chief purpose was to create a constructive dialogue between two parties 
who had failed to see eye-to-eye for decades. While Sunningdale collapsed due to Unionist 
opposition, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was worded so that it allowed room for opposition. If 
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anything, it embraced opposition (peaceful, political opposition), and in doing so, it represented 
the acknowledgement of “the other” by both sides. 
 Still, the agreement was met with mixed reaction, especially from the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) who felt they, according to UUP Leader Ian Paisley, “had been betrayed by 
Margaret Thatcher.” Paisley’s disgust with the Anglo-Irish Agreement was largely due to his 
belief that Thatcher was trying to appease Nationalists, when in fact she claimed the agreement 
was actually an attempt to turn pragmatic Nationalists against the IRA by paving the way to 
peace through political means. This recognition ceded to Nationalists, though designed to 
undermine the IRA, in many ways, legitimized the Nationalist cause (and somewhat ironically 
the IRA), and alienated Unionists. However, the agreement did not alienate either side to the 
point of a derailment of the peace process. Peace was beginning to take hold. In the eyes of many 
the agreement “marked in principle a deeper recognition than ever before by the British 
Government of the legitimacy of the Republic’s concern with Northern Ireland, and of its 
potential contribution to the resolution of the Ulster question” (Lee 1989:456-457). The Anglo-
Irish Agreement did not cause an end to the violence in Northern Ireland, an unfortunate 
outcome that might make it seem like another failed attempt at building peace in a deeply 
divided society. However, the cross-community dialogue it sought to foster was integral in 
creating an environment conducive to peace, changing the relational system of conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Lee (1989), writing without the support of over two decades of subsequent 
history, feels that the agreement was “ a modest, but not insignificant concession to 
reality”(457). Briefly returning to the Enniskillen Bombing of 1987 (two years after the 
agreement was signed) we can now more completely understand just why widespread reaction, 
even within the most Republican circles, was so negative. As Fitzgerald was quoted in the Irish 
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Times the day after the agreement was signed “Nationalists can stand shoulder to shoulder and 
be seen on an equal footing as Unionists in the community” (Irish Times, November 16, 1985). 
As the community in Northern Ireland moved towards peace and equality, brutal acts of violence 
such as the Enniskillen Bombing, became more widely condemned, signifying that a 
transformation was occurring and the a culture of peace was developing. 
4.4c The Downing Street Declaration (1993): “A New Era of Trust” 
 In 1993, John Major and Albert Reynolds, heads of government from the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, respectively, issued a joint statement now known as the 
Downing Street Declaration. This was a twelve-point document, which summarized the desires 
of both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to achieve peace in Northern Ireland 
within the decade. Peace Agreements in 1973 and 1985 had varying degrees of success, but both 
indicated a mutual commitment by Britain and Ireland to engineering peace in the contested 
region of Northern Ireland. For the first time ever, the Downing Street Declaration stated that 
parties linked with paramilitaries would be allowed take part in talks if linked paramilitary 
groups abandoned violent conflict. This statement represented a unique turning point in The 
Troubles, suggesting that both sides were willing to recognize the legitimacy of the cause of 
formerly violent organizations by holding talks with their political wings so long as violence 
ceased. The declaration was made around the same time SDLP leader John Hume and Sinn Fein 
leader Gerry Adams were developing a new political strategy for the Republican community in 
Northern Ireland, characterized by peaceful political progress. The declaration, coupled with the 
results of the Hume-Adams Talks was enough to produce a brief PIRA ceasefire in 1994. The 
new era of trust promised by the Downing Street Agreement further entrenched Great Britain, 
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Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland in the notion that peace could be achieved in 
Ulster. 
Primary 
Summary of the Text of the Declaration (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk) 
 The Downing Street Declaration recognized that the “most urgent and important issue 
facing the people of Ireland, North an South, and the British and Irish Governments together, is 
to remove the conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions…” resulting 
from The Troubles. The Declaration reasserts the right of the people of Northern Ireland to self-
determination and the British Government’s desire to “see peace, stability, and reconciliation 
established by agreement among all the people inhabiting the island.” Furthermore, Reynolds 
and Major cite a renewed desire to “work to create a new era of trust… in which every effort 
must be made to build a new series of trust between [nationalist and unionist] communities.” 
Echoing the wording of the Anglo-Irish agreement eight years prior, Taoiseach Reynolds 
“recognizes the need to engage in dialogue which would address the honesty and integrity of the 
fears of all traditions.” Most importantly, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are “determined 
to build on the fervent wish of both their peoples to see old fears and anomalies replaced by a 
climate of peace.” In the statements that followed the release of the actual declaration itself, 
Reynolds said “I was not prepared through inaction to condemn the people of Northern Ireland to 
another 25 years of violence. They deserve better” The Taoiseach continues “…let December 
1993 be the moment we begin to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland… no one should be 
afraid of peace. Here is the opportunity for peace. Here, let us all make our stand” (December 15, 
1993). 
Irish Times 
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 Recognizing the incredible significance of the Downing Street Declaration, the Irish 
Times hailed the declaration, leading off with “PROSPECT OF IRA CEASEFIRE IN THE 
BALANCE AFTER JOINT DECLARATION. SINN FEIN PLANS TALKS WITHIN NEXT 
FEW DAYS” (December 16, 1993). Once again, the article makes note of Unionist opposition, 
as the UUP “expressed deep misgivings of yesterday’s statement.” The Times embraces the 
declaration as a “historic affirmation that the British Government would uphold the democratic 
wish of ‘a greater number of the people’ of Northern Ireland to support the Union.” Of greater 
significance is the mention of the prospect of Sinn Fein once again entering the fold in 
government peace talks. 
London Times 
 The London Times chose to highlight the uncertainty it felt that prevailed throughout 
Northern Ireland following the release of the declaration reading “ULSTER HOLDS ITS 
BREATH ON PEACE ACCORD” (December 16, 1993). The article describes John Major and 
Albert Reynolds as standing “shoulder to shoulder” challenging “the men of violence to put 
down their weapons and negotiate a permanent peace in Northern Ireland.” Again, “… hardline 
Unionists were left isolated with cries of treachery” but Major encouraged them to “grasp the 
opportunity for peace” because “another might not come their way.” In a powerful statement, the 
article quotes Major as saying “we cannot go on spilling blood in the name of the past.” An 
important analysis presented in the Times article discusses how both Reynolds and Major found 
a way to appease the majority of concerned parties in the release of the declaration. Still, Mr. Ian 
Paisley expressed his disgust with being “told that in three months’ time the IRA who had 
butchered, slaughtered, and murdered his constituents would be invited to sit down as 
constitutional politicians if they ceased their violence.” In a stern defiance to Unionist-bloc 
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opposition Prime Minister Major responded “I wish to take action to make sure there’s no 
bloodshed of this sort, no more coffins carried away week after week because politicians will not 
have the courage to sit down, address the problems and find away through.” 
Academic 
 Contrary to Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street Declaration 
was not a legislative document. It was instead a reassertion of a commitment to conflict 
resolution. The Downing Street Declaration reminded the population of Great Britain and Ireland 
that peaceful progress would be the only path forward for all parties hoping to gain from the 
peace process. Perhaps most importantly, the declaration (and the Hume-Adams Talks) put 
increased pressure on the IRA to cease its armed campaign (Hennessey 1997:288). While the 
cessation of the IRA’s armed campaign was vital to the peace process, Coakley (2002) argues the 
mandate of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland into any future peace agreements in Northern 
Ireland was equally valuable in developing mutual trust between both governments and both 
communities (p.25). Viewing Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreements as essentially 
impotent peace agreements, Fay (1999) remarks that the Downing Street Declaration was “the 
beginning of the peace process” (p.64). 
Synthesis 
 Fay’s (1999) assertion that the Downing Street Declaration was the ‘beginning’ of the 
peace process is valid, but fails to recognize Lederach’s position that conflict is best analytically 
framed as a process. As positive Conflict Transformation (concentrated efforts at peacebuilding) 
is both a process and an end result (Berghof definition of Conflict Transformation), it seems 
incorrect to say that the Downing Street Declaration marked the beginning of the peace process 
in Northern Ireland. The peace process, though in fledgling form, began shortly after the conflict 
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erupted, through dialogue—both positive and negative. This paper locates the Downing Street 
Declaration as part of the process of Conflict Transformation. The foundation of the Downing 
Street Agreement was built on top of years of conflict and patchwork peace agreements. Its 
primary purpose was to bury the violence of the past and fill in the gaps of prior peace 
arrangements by displaying an even stronger commitment to mutual recognition and 
understanding. Unlike Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street 
Declaration gave political parties and also paramilitary groups time to digest its stated goals. 
There was no immediate legislation to vote on—simply just a renewed commitment to peace in 
Northern Ireland. The Downing Street Declaration represented a renewed commitment to peace 
that would ultimately lead to the most groundbreaking and successful peace agreement in the 
history of Northern Ireland. 
4.4d The Belfast Agreement (1998): A Conflict Transformed 
 In 1998 British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern held peace 
talks between eight political parties in Northern Ireland. Included were Sinn Fein and the UUP, 
two parties who for the duration of The Troubles had adamantly opposed each other. What 
emerged from these talks was the Belfast Agreement, or Good Friday Agreement, which is the 
most comprehensive peace agreement to date in the history of Northern Ireland. Provisions of the 
agreement included: the removal of the Republic of Ireland’s constitutional claim to Northern 
Ireland, the decommissioning of paramilitary organizations, the creation of a new executive, the 
creation of a new North-South Ministerial Council, and most controversially, the release of 
paramilitary prisoners whose respective organizations upheld their promise to abide by an 
indefinite ceasefire following the agreement. The passage of the Belfast Agreement is indicative 
of a definite transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. With both sides conceding more 
  84 
than could have been imaginable in 1968, 1978, or 1988, it is evident that a culture of peace has 
truly taken root in Northern Ireland. And while occasional violence still occurs throughout the 
reason, it has decreased drastically from the years of The Troubles. 
Primary 
Summary of the Text of the Agreement (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk) 
 The Belfast Agreement reiterated the positions of both governments on the peace process 
in Northern Ireland as the only solution to continued conflict. It contains a legal agreement 
between the Irish and British Governments, as well as a second document discussing the 
agreements between the eight parties involved in the talks.  
 The legal section of the document sets forth four provisions that support peace 
“partnership, equality, and mutual respect” as the tenets of sociopolitical progress in Northern 
Ireland. It also stresses the need to oppose the use of political violence through intra-
governmental cooperation and a commitment to democratic and peaceful means of resolving 
political differences. The agreement makes official the recognition that both Unionist and 
Nationalist views regarding the constitutional position of Northern Ireland are legitimate and that 
the United Kingdom is merely upholding the wish of the majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. Additionally, it reaffirms the birthright of citizens 
of Northern Ireland to obtain Irish citizenship in additional to their given British citizenship. 
Most prominently, the first section of the agreement repeals Article 2 and 3 of the Irish 
constitution that claims the island of Ireland is one national territory. 
 Following the legal section, the agreement is divided into three strands. Strand one calls 
for the creation of new laws for cross-community legislation, which require both majority and 
minority approval. It also stipulates that issues to be voted on by cross-community legislation 
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will be designated in advance. If the assembly feels that a certain issue not designated for cross-
community legislation should be subjected to cross-community legislation such a decision can be 
triggered by “petition of concern by a significant minority” (30 members of 108). Furthermore, 
strand one calls for the creation an equality commission “to investigate individual complaints 
against public bodies.” The strand also deals with the operation of the new assembly, where 
delegates will “register a designation of identity” as Nationalist, Unionist, or ‘other’ for the 
purposes of cross-community legislation. Strand two outlines the creation of a new North-South 
Ministerial Council devised to promote and support “consultation, cooperation, and action within 
the Island of Ireland… on matters of mutual interest.” Strand three expresses the desire for the 
creation of a British-Irish Council to support “harmonious and mutually beneficial development 
of relationships among the people of Great Britain and Ireland” and recognize the “Irish 
Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland.” 
 Outside of the Intergovernmental Councils, the Belfast Agreement outlines a desire to 
reexamine the sociopolitical landscape of Northern Ireland by establishing provisions for 
“reconciliation and victims of violence, decommissioning, security, police and justice, and 
prisoners.” With the establishment of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission, the agreement 
notes “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of victims of violence as a 
necessary element of reconciliation” and that the most suitable tribute to victims of violence in 
Northern Ireland is the sustainable development of a peaceful society. Following a successful 
ceasefire, both governments will see to it that paramilitary organizations are successfully and 
smoothly decommissioned within approximately two years following the passage of the 
agreement. In response to demands for the reduction of British troops in Northern Ireland to 
normal appropriate peacetime standards the British Government conceded it “will make progress 
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towards… a return as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland.” This 
stipulation also included a British pledge to reduce the number and role of armed forces in 
Northern Ireland, the removal of checkpoints and the Emergency Powers Act. It additionally 
established the importance of “consultative cooperation with the Irish Government and 
respective political parties regarding response to any continuing paramilitary activity.” In the 
realm of the police service, the agreement was quite similar to prior agreements and declaration 
in stressing the importance of cross-community recognition for the police service and called for a 
widespread review and revamping of the police service. Finally, the Belfast Agreement was the 
first piece of legislation to officially recognize paramilitary prisoners as more than just common 
criminals so long as their organizations agreed to end their armed campaigns. “Both governments 
will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated program for the release of prisoners… 
convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland.” Also stipulated was the necessity of 
governmental facilitation of the reintegration of prisoners by providing sustained support for 
them before and after their release “including assistance directed towards availing of 
employment opportunities, retraining or re-skilling, and further education.” In sum, the Belfast 
Agreement represents the most comprehensive and dynamic piece of legislation in the Northern 
Ireland peace process. 
Irish Times 
 Being the most groundbreaking achievement to date in the history of the Northern Ireland 
peace process, the Belfast Agreement received international media attention. In the Republic of 
Ireland, the Irish Times wrote: “HISTORIC AGREEMENT MARKS NEW BEGINNING FOR 
US ALL” with a short sub-headline “LAST MINUTE INTERVENTION BY CLINTON TO 
REASSURE UNIONISTS” (Irish Times, April 11, 1998). The article makes mention that the 
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agreement is a culmination of almost two years of discussions, concluding with almost thirty-six 
hours of uninterrupted discussions. Quoting mediator and former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, 
the article reads “I cannot think of a comparable instance when two leaders of governments came 
and participated in a round the clock, hands on basis for several days as they have done. Leader 
of the SDLP John Hume is quoted as saying the agreement is a “once in a generation” type 
opportunity to resolve our deep and tragic conflict.” 
London Times 
 Two London Times articles cover the Belfast Agreement and again express great hope 
for the future. The first article discusses the role of external support in sustaining the agreement, 
“CLINTON BACKS BEST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN A GENERATION” (London Times, 
April 11, 1998). Recalling Major and Reynolds’ efforts some five years prior, the article reads, 
“all parties and all the rest of us must stand shoulder to shoulder” in an effort to defy violent 
detractors of the agreement. The other article offers a much more sentimental analysis of the 
agreement, a major juxtaposition of the thirty years of violence reported in previous years. 
“ULSTER CHOOSES HOPE OVER HATE,” (London Times, April 11, 1998), the article reads 
triumphantly. Tony Blair further supports these emotions as he boldly states, “courage has 
triumphed.” The article also mentions that paramilitary prisoners are to be released within two or 
three years of the passage of the agreement provided their organizations abide by the ceasefire. 
Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams is also quoted: “Republicans and Nationalists will come to this 
document, some with skepticism, most with hope. They will ask whether it offers a chance for 
the way forward, and when we democratically have come to a conclusion, we will tell the 
world.” Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, co-architect of the agreement stated that the Belfast 
Agreement “marks a new beginning for all of us.” 
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Academic 
 Throughout the most recent academic histories of The Troubles in Northern Ireland, the 
Belfast Agreement is discussed as a major turning point in The Troubles. In most texts, it marks 
the end of The Troubles, and the beginning of a new, less violent, though still controversial era 
of Northern Irish politics. The Belfast Agreement was unique because it followed on the coattails 
of Unionists deciding to ‘confront’ Sinn Fein (Fay, 1999:65). The driving force behind the 
agreement was that it incorporated a wide range of political parties (eight in total), many of 
whom had been excluded for generations from the Northern Irish political system, in talks 
alongside “two sovereign governments” (Fay, 1999: 65). Furthermore, increased opposition to 
paramilitary organizations leading up to the agreement meant that the “IRA campaign ended in 
quiet disgrace in the mid-1990s” (Coakley, 2002:130). The end to the IRA campaign, coupled 
with “the Good Friday Agreement [Belfast Agreement] of 1998 recognized the interdependence 
of the two parts of Ireland and the necessity of their living in peace with each other” (Coakley 
2002:130). The Belfast Agreement is generally perceived by scholars of Irish history as the 
benchmark of transformative legislation in the peace process in Northern Ireland. It is a 
“complex and far reach document that attempts to provide a reasonable balance between 
competing claims and aspirations of Unionism and Nationalism, it redefines relations within 
“North, North-and-South, and Britain-and-Ireland” (Porter, 2003:197). Most importantly, the 
agreement’s desire to decommission paramilitary organizations through recognition was integral 
to taking the gun out of Northern Irish politics. 
Synthesis 
 The Belfast Agreement figures more prominently than any other act of protest, violence, 
and peace in the course of the transformation of conflict in Northern Ireland because it is the 
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most dynamic, comprehensive attempt at dealing with the “structural, behavioral, and attitudinal 
aspects of the conflict” (Berghof definition of Conflict Tansformation). Additionally, it goes 
further “…than conflict settlement or conflict management” in that its basic tenets are structured 
to remove the root causes of the conflict by creating an open dialogue where conflicting parties 
can voice their concerns. The agreement voted on in 1998 and implemented in 1999 was 
“remarkable because of the fact that unlike any previous initiative, the negotiations that produced 
the agreement included political representatives of the main paramilitary organizations” (Porter, 
2003:200). The Belfast Agreement not only had the support of the British and Irish Governments 
and numerous political parties in Northern Ireland, it had the support of the PIRA, the UVF, and 
the UDA. These three paramilitary organizations were responsible for some of the most violent, 
appalling moments of The Troubles. For decades, both camps of paramilitary organizations 
identified themselves as political actors. In accepting the Belfast Agreement, they accepted that 
they could act in a civilized political manner and as a result, the political realm conferred upon 
them, and many of their imprisoned colleagues, political status. While Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher refused to concede that any crime could be political, the Belfast Agreement made that 
incredibly difficult concession, and indicated to paramilitaries, political parties, and the people of 
Northern Ireland that peace, above everything else, was the only way forward. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 The peace process in Northern Ireland very much mirrored the ebb and flow of The 
Troubles. An analysis of the peace process, when placed on top of a thorough exploration of The 
Troubles (4.1-4.3) produces an image of Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland. 
Sunningdale (1973) attempted to bring together a deeply divided society without providing a 
clear mechanism by which constructive dialogue could bridge the gap between Nationalist and 
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Unionist camps. Twelve years later, the Anglo-Irish Agreement once again attempted to promote 
peace, instead this time using loose wording so as to leave the agreement open to interpretation 
and constructive debate. The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 aimed to reaffirm a 
commitment to peace by both the British Government and the Irish Government. Five years later, 
the Belfast Agreement made good on that commitment, producing widespread reforms in the 
political and cultural relationships within Northern Ireland, and between the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland.  
5. Conclusion: A Conflict Transformed 
 I would like to briefly return to the definition provided by the Berghof Foundation for 
Conflict Studies, which defines Conflict Transformation as:  
 …[a] generic, comprehensive term referring to actions and processes seeking to alter the 
various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes 
of a particular conflict over the long term. It aims to transform negative destructive conflict 
into positive constructive conflict and deals with structural, behavioral, and attitudinal 
aspects of conflict. The term refers to both the process and the completion of the process. 
As such, it incorporates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution and goes farther than conflict settlement or conflict management.  
Between 1968 and 1998, The Troubles of Northern Ireland went from being a latent conflict to 
an incredibly violent, negative conflict. Yet somehow today Northern Ireland stands on the 
doorstep of peace. This is because a conflict, much like most all other dimensions of human life, 
can change and be changed. This change is the ultimate goal of Conflict Transformation. 
 In 1968 and 1969, a population of Nationalists (mostly Catholic) decided they had put up 
with enough and a civil rights movement was born. As Lederach so aptly described, Northern 
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Ireland was a deeply divided society, with distinct units of cultural, religious and political 
identity. As Nationalists clashed with Unionists over issues such as gerrymandering and equal 
representation, Unionists further tightened the stranglehold on the power structure in Northern 
Ireland, thus enraging the Catholic, Nationalist population even more. As riots raged throughout 
Northern Ireland in 1969, sectarian violence increased and the situation rapidly deteriorated, 
prompting Stormont to enlist the assistance of the British Army to restore order. Coupled with 
the new security policy of Internment, the presence of the British Army escalated the conflict to 
a new level, as it would ultimately bear responsibility for killing fourteen innocent civil rights 
protesters during the Bloody Sunday Massacre in 1972. 
 Following the events of Bloody Sunday, The Troubles rapidly spiraled out of control and 
a protracted period of violent, tit-for-tat escalation began—which I call “negative destructive 
conflict” which Augsberger argues culminates in a zero-sum gain where all involved parties 
emerged feeling they have accomplished little or nothing. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
violence continued, and while the history of individual events during this time lends credence to 
the notion that paramilitary violence may have achieved political progress, the Enniskillen 
Bombings in 1987 tell us otherwise. The sheer audacity and widespread condemnation of the 
‘Remembrance Day Bombing’ as it is known now, caused the IRA to fracture and reconsider its 
position within the Republican movement. While individual events of the escalation period may 
have seemed like victories to conflict participants at the time, the ultimate result of escalation 
was more violence and more death on either side of the conflict. It did, in fact, produce a feeling 
of loss (as Augsberger posits) in both Nationalist and Unionist circles. The escalation period 
reminds us, that like Lederach (1997) argues, conflict is a process and must be analyzed as such 
rather than a fragmented case-by-case history. 
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 Rewinding to 1981, an analysis of the Republican Hunger Strikes in Maze Prison gives 
us a better understanding of the degree of depth at which The Troubles divided Northern Ireland. 
If empowerment and recognition are at the heart of transformative mediation (Coy 2009), the 
Republican Hunger Strikes illustrate just how negative a conflict can become if these two ideas 
are ignored. The Republican Hunger Strikes are the embodiment of The Troubles: a clash of two 
different political narratives, and the failure of either side to legitimize the other. Framed through 
a Nationalist lens, ten hunger strikers died in an attempt to gain political status from a corrupt, 
oppressive British Government. When examined through a Unionist lens, ten ordinary criminals 
died on hunger strike, asking for something they were never entitled to in the first place. It is 
hear the fundamental problem of The Troubles is uncovered: the unwillingness of either side of 
the conflict to empower and recognize the legitimacy of the other’s concern.  
 This position enables us to understand why a fledgling peace process, beginning with the 
Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, blossomed into one of the most successful stories of Conflict 
Transformation in history. In 1973, a year after the British Army massacred 14 civil rights 
protesters on Bloody Sunday, and IRA retaliation was responsible for the indiscriminate 
slaughter of numerous civilians, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed. A supposed peace 
agreement that stipulated a power sharing executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland, it was 
rapidly dismantled by Unionist opposition and fear. While white-collar politicians expressed a 
desire for peace they could do little to achieve it, as the sociopolitical climate in Northern Ireland 
was wracked with fear and lack of trust and was clearly not prepared to constructively engage the 
opposition (as evidenced by the UWC strike). The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) took into 
account the pitfalls of Sunningdale, and produced a carefully worded, yet open-ended document 
that laid the groundwork for continued constructive cooperation at a cross-community and cross-
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border level. It was around this time that Sinn Fein, the IRA as well as Loyalist paramilitaries 
began to reconsider the nature of their campaign. Public support was waning, enlistment was 
falling, and culture of peace was developing. The 1993 Downing Street Declaration reaffirmed 
that desire and also recognized the importance of having the Republic of Ireland on board with 
the peace process as well. Ultimately, the Belfast Agreement in 1998 represented the most 
comprehensive step forward in Conflict Transformation in the history of Northern Ireland, as 
both sides conceded recognition and legitimacy to the other. Most notably, this recognition came 
in the form of the early release of paramilitary prisoners belonging to organizations abiding by 
the ceasefire (PIRA, UVF, and UDA), as well as a constitutional change in the Republic of 
Ireland removed the Republic’s claim to Northern Ireland. 
 Looking Forward 
 At the time this is being written (2011), Northern Ireland is still dealing with the horrors 
of the past. Just by reading the Belfast Telegraph every day, one gets a sense that the lines that 
divided the country during The Troubles still exist. Investigations are ongoing into the crimes of 
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Sectarian violence still occurs, though not on the same level as it 
once did, and the question remains: will The Troubles return to Northern Ireland? That is a 
question only time can answer. Yet it is worth recognizing that a proactive engagement by both 
Nationalists and Unionists and those in between has historically produced a genuine 
transformation. While the stipulations of the Belfast Agreement may not be perfect, they 
represent a commitment by both sides of the conflict to work together and even integrate in the 
interest of economic development, security, and genuine peace—all of which are crucial to 
preventing the growth of negative destructive conflict. 
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6. Appendix 
 1.1 Lynch’s Speech (August 13, 1969) 
  It is clear now that the present situation cannot be allowed to continue. 
It is evident also that the Stormont government is no longer in control of the 
situation. Indeed, the present situation is the inevitable outcome of the policies 
pursued for decades by successive Stormont governments. It is clear also that 
the Irish Government can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured 
and perhaps worse. It is obvious that the RUC is no longer accepted as an 
impartial police force. Neither would the employment of British troops be 
acceptable nor would they be likely to restore peaceful conditions, certainly not 
in the long term. The Irish Government have, therefore, requested the British 
Government to apply immediately to the United Nations for the urgent dispatch 
of a Peace-Keeping Force to the Six Counties of Northern Ireland and have 
instructed the Permanent Representative to the United Nations to inform the 
Secretary General of this request. We have also asked the British Government to 
see to it that police attacks on the people of Derry should cease immediately. 
  Very many people have been injured and some of them seriously. We 
know that many of these do not wish to be treated in Six County hospitals. We 
have, therefore, directed the Irish Army authorities to have field hospitals 
established in County Donegal adjacent to Derry and at other points along the 
Border where they may be necessary. 
 Recognising, however, that the re-unification of the national 
territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it is our 
intention to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with 
the Irish Government to review the present constitutional position of the Six 
Counties of Northern Ireland.  
 
 1.2 Transcript of BBC Broadcast of Bloody Sunday (January 30, 1972) 
   
  Reporter: Can you tell me what happened when the Paratroopers 
  came in Father? 
  Father Edward Daly: They came in firing. The people, there was no   
  provocation whatsoever. Uhh 
  Reporter: Firing what? Rubber bullets? 
  Father Edward Daly: No, eh, it was Led Bullets they fired, they     
  seemed to fire in all directions. Ah there’s some rubber bullets too,     
  they didn’t even seem to fire at (Unintelligible)… It was just      
  completely outrageous, disgraceful, I don’t know… (Shaking head).     
  They call themselves an army, it’s utterly disgraceful. 
Reporter: You’re quite sure there was nothing fired at them first? 
Daly: There was nothing fired at them, sir, I’m absolutely just certain of that I 
can speak of this eh, without any difficulty whatsoever because I was there. I 
was just standing at the flats when they started to the conclusion and there was 
nothing fired at them, positively nothing. Whatsoever. There weren’t even 
stones thrown, people ran in all directions and they opened fire. Most people had 
their backs to them when they opened fire at the time. 
Reporter: A short while ago we filmed you with a white, with a white 
handkerchief, 
Daly: Yes 
Reporter: and about four in your party with a boy who was dead or dying. How 
was he shot? 
Daly: That little boy was shot when he was running away, he was just a little bit 
behind me when he fell. I heard the shot I looked around and… 
Reporter: You know him? 
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Daly: Yes, he was shot 
Reporter: He was a young man wasn’t he? 
Daly: He was a young boy I’d say of about fifteen, sixteen, thereabouts. 
Reporter: He didn’t have a weapon? 
Daly: No, he was just a young boy, about 15, he was running… I was running 
too. 
 
Cuts to interview with General Robert Ford  
FORD: In fact they did not fire until they were fired upon and my information 
at the moment, and it is very, almost immediately after the incident, is that the 
Para battalion fired three rounds altogether, after they had something between 
ten and twenty fired at them from the area—the flats over there. 
Reporter: They fired three rounds only? 
FORD: From my information at the moment, they fired three. 
Reporter: I believe there are more than three, I’ve seen three dead myself. 
FORD: Well they may not have been killed by—by our soldiers. 
Reporter: Unintelligible… Are you saying that the paras only opened fire 
because they were fired upon first? Because the people in the Bogside are saying 
that no shots were fired at the troops as they came in. 
FORD: Most certainly absolutely no doubt at all that they were, the 
paratroopers did not open up until they’d been fired at. 
You’ll remember that the aim of the operation in fact was an arrest operation, 
against the hooligans who’d been attacking for a couple of hours.” 
Reporter: Yes well have any British troops been hit by gunfire? 
FORD: Yes as the paratroopers went in, eh acid bombs were dropped from the 
(unintelligible) and two soldiers were injured, one I believe seriously. It was at 
this time in fact that the gunmen opened up 
Reporter: Two Paras were hit by acid bombs, well have any British soldiers 
been hit by bullets? 
FORD: None as far as I’m aware of at this moment. 
Reporter: Why was it necessary for the paras to take aggressive action at all 
and to go into the Bogside instead of just snatching the people at the head of the 
procession who were causing the trouble? 
FORD: The aggressive action was taken because quite apart from the march, incidentally I was 
watching the march and I saw the stewards stop it and indeed try and keep control to us, 
unfortunately a hooligan element took over and they came down to our position down here and uh 
started to attack the troops as you saw, they attacked them with bricks, stones, very sort of nasty 
implements, and including of course a couple of canisters of CS gas. This went on for some time 
and it was obviously necessary to restore law and order. 
 
 
 1.3 Widgery Report (10 April, 1972) 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. There would have been no deaths in Londonderry on 30 January if those 
who organised the illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous 
situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was 
almost inevitable. 
2. The decision to contain the march within the Bogside and Creggan had been 
opposed by the Chief Superintendent of Police in Londonderry but was fully 
justified by events and was successfully carried out. 
3. If the Army had persisted in its "low key" attitude and had not launched a 
large-scale operation to arrest hooligans the day might have passed off without 
serious incident. 
4. The intention of the senior Army officers to use 1 Para as an arrest force and 
not for other offensive purposes was sincere.  
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5. An arrest operation carried out in Battalion strength in circumstances in 
which the troops were likely to come under fire involved hazard to civilians in 
the area which Commander 8 Brigade may have under-estimated.  
6. The order to launch the arrest operation was given by Commander 8 
Brigade. The tactical details were properly left to CO 1 Para who did not exceed 
his orders. In view of the experience of the unit in operations of this kind it was 
not necessary for CO 1 Para to give orders in greater detail than he did. 
7. When the vehicles and soldiers of Support Company appeared in Rossville 
Street they came under fire. Arrests were made; but in a very short time the 
arrest operation took second place and the soldiers turned to engage their 
assailants. There is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened 
fire if they had not been fired upon first. 
8. Soldiers who identified armed gunmen fired upon them in accordance with 
the standing orders in the Yellow Card. Each soldier was his own judge of 
whether he had identified a gunman. Their training made them aggressive and 
quick in decision and some showed more restraint in opening fire than others. At 
one end of the scale some soldiers showed a high degree of responsibility; at the 
other, notably in Glenfada Park, firing bordered on the reckless. These 
distinctions reflect differences in the character and temperament of the soldiers 
concerned. 
9. The standing orders contained in the Yellow Card are satisfactory. Any 
further restrictions on opening fire would inhibit the soldier from taking proper 
steps for his own safety and that of his comrades and unduly hamper the 
engagement of gunmen. 
10. None of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst 
handling a firearm or bomb. Some are wholly acquitted of complicity in such 
action; but there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons 
or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that yet others had been 
closely supporting them. 
11. There was no general breakdown in discipline. For the most part the 
soldiers acted as they did because they thought their orders required it. No order 
and no training can ensure that a soldier will always act wisely, as well as 
bravely and with initiative. The individual soldier ought not to have to bear the 
burden of deciding whether to open fire in confusion such as prevailed on 30 
January. In the conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland, however, this is often 
inescapable. 
 
WIDGERY 
 
W. J. Smith, Secretary, 
10 April, 1972 
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